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Abstract: This Article critiques the legal and theoretical premises of the “major 
questions doctrine,” and proposes a revision of the doctrine that better comports 
with the institutional structure and ideological origins of our administrative state. 
The major questions doctrine holds that courts generally should not defer to 
agency statutory interpretations that concern questions of “vast economic or 
political significance.”  This doctrine, most recently invoked by the Supreme 
Court in King v. Burwell, purports to enforce the constitutional norms of non-
delegation and popular sovereignty.  But it relies on two auxiliary political-
theoretic assumptions about the proper roles of courts and agencies.  First, it 
imports the assumption of the Legal Process School that courts are always the 
primary interpreters of the important value questions implicated by statutory law.  
Second, it imports Max Weber’s assumption that administrative officials are 
morally-neutral technocrats, who should only implement value choices specified 
by statute.  These assumptions do not capture important aspects of the 
institutional structure and ideological justification for our American 
administrative state.  I show how the Progressive thinkers who first advocated 
administrative governance in the United States believed that administrators should 
resolve important value questions in consultation with the affected public.  Our 
current institutions reflect this vision to a significant degree, with broad-textured 
statutes that leave significant norm-setting authority to agencies, while requiring 
that such decisions be made through participatory procedures.  I propose that the 
major questions doctrine should be reformulated, so that an agency’s resolution of 
a “major question” can receive full Chevron deference if it is promulgated 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking and addresses the relevant political and 
economic questions in the rulemaking record.  If an agency’s interpretation is not 
promulgated through rulemaking, the reviewing court should give deference to 
the agency’s interpretation proportional to the degree of its deliberative 






The specter of the non-delegation doctrine haunts the administrative state.  
The non-delegation doctrine holds that Congress may not delegate its lawmaking 
power to an administrative agency without providing an “intelligible principle” to 
guide and constrain its activity.1  While the non-delegation doctrine has not been 
                                                 
1 Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
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invoked to strike down a federal statute since the 1930s, 2  a presumption of 
statutory interpretation has now taken shape that aims to provide a similar check 
on administrative discretion.  This presumption has been described as the “major 
questions” doctrine.3 
The major questions doctrine is a prominent exception to the general 
principle of judicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutory 
ambiguities. Courts will normally afford agency interpretations of such 
ambiguities some degree of weight or deference, depending upon the level of 
authority Congress has delegated to the agency, the subject-matter jurisdiction 
and expertise of the agency, and the formality of the procedure through which 
such interpretations have been issued.4 However, in a series of cases in the past 
three decades, the Supreme Court has held that, where the statutory ambiguity 
raises a question of particular “economic and political significance,” it will 
presume that Congress did not intend the agency to resolve the issue.5 Instead, the 
reviewing court resolves the ambiguity itself, without giving any weight or 
deference to the agency’s positon.    
The major questions doctrine has played a key role in recent, high profile 
cases. In King v. Burwell,6 the Supreme Court refused to defer to the Internal 
Revenue Services’ interpretation of the Affordable Care Act’s provision of tax 
credits for health insurance purchased through an “Exchange established by a 
State.” 7  The Court reasoned that this provision was “among the Act’s key 
reforms,” involving billions of dollars and affecting the health insurance coverage 
of millions of Americans.8  The interpretation of this provision therefore raised 
questions of “such deep economic and political significance,” that the Court 
presumed Congress did not intend the IRS to resolve them.9 “This is not a case for 
the IRS. It is instead our task to determine the correct reading.”10 In Texas v. 
U.S., 11  the Fifth Circuit likewise found that the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Deferred Action Program for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents (DAPA) was likely unlawful in part because it “undoubtedly 
                                                 
2 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
3 See, e.g. Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236-45 (2006); Abbe 
R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From The Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. 
Rev. 901, 990-95 (2013). 
4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); U.S. 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
5 Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 147 (U.S. 
2000); Utility Regulatory Air Group v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014); King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015). 
6 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
7 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
8 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
9 Id. 
10Id. 
11 809 F. 3d. 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S.Ct. 2271 
(2016). 
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implicates question[s] of deep economic and political significance.”12 If Congress 
had wished to give DHS authority to deferral removal proceedings for over 4 
million undocumented immigrants, “it surely would have done so expressly.”13   
These cases go to show that, despite its relatively spare use, the major 
questions doctrine is a potentially revolutionary (or reactionary) tool of statutory 
construction. Precisely because the major questions doctrine is triggered by a 
court’s perception that the interpretive question at issue is politically salient, the 
doctrine authorizes judicial policymaking in the very cases that have the highest 
visibility and greatest impact for the American public.  It is a recipe for judicial 
governance of political questions. 
This Article explores and critiques the jurisprudential and normative 
assumptions that support the major questions doctrine. The jurisprudential 
foundation for the major questions doctrine is the constitutional principle of non-
delegation. Both the major questions and non-delegation doctrine aim to ensure 
that Congress does not quit its responsibility to determine the basic principles and 
policies that administrative agencies will implement. To ensure democratic 
accountability, the Court presumes that Congress does not generally intend to 
leave important questions of policy to agencies. Instead, even if the statute 
appears to be ambiguous, the judiciary will attempt to ascertain its meaning. The 
major questions doctrine thus aims to reinforce democratic constitutionalism by 
keeping important questions of principle and policy out of the hands of 
administrative agencies altogether. 
 I argue, however, that the major questions doctrine is a poor way to 
institutionalize this crucial concern to preserve democratic constitutionalism in 
the administrative state. The major questions doctrine relies on two interrelated 
normative assumptions.  The first assumption, which can be traced to the great 
scholars of the Legal Process School, is that the courts should be the primary 
interpreters of the principles and policies enacted in legislation.14  The second 
assumption was first expressed in Max Weber’s sociology of law, and has 
subsequently been incorporated into American administrative law scholarship: 
bureaucracy should be treated only as an efficient, neutral instrument for 
implementing goals established by statute.15  These assumptions, however, fail to 
account for a salient feature of our current institutional regime: that agencies can 
accrue democratic authority to make value choices from their deliberations with 
the affected public, and from oversight by the President. 
I present a “Progressive” theory of the administrative state that better 
captures this democracy-enhancing capacity of our administrative procedure.  I 
call this state “Progressive” because it was imagined by American Progressives 
like John Dewey, Woodrow Wilson, and Frank Goodnow, who first advocated 
expansive national regulatory power in the United States. 16  Progressive 
conceptions of the American state have received renewed attention in recent 
                                                 
12 Id. at 181 (internal quotations omitted). 
13 Id. 
14 See infra Part III.A.  
15 See infra Part III.B. 
16 See infra Part IV.B. 
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years, not only from scholars who broadly support the Progressive vision of 
active, democratically authorized, administrative regulation, 17  but also from 
conservatives who trace the decline of American constitutionalism to 
Progressivism. 18   Legal scholarship, however, continues to operate under 
misapprehensions about the content and commitments of Progressivism, usually 
emphasizing only the Progressive concern with bureaucratic “expertise.”19  This 
paper therefore reassesses the “original intent” of the Progressives to address the 
real constitutional concern the major questions doctrine purports to address: how 
can the state remain democratic if important decisions are made by unelected 
bureaucrats? 
The Progressives developed a uniquely democratic conception of the 
administrative state.   They followed the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel in 
understanding the administrative state as an institution that guarantees individual 
freedom through regulation and social welfare provision.20  But, unlike Hegel, 
they argued that administration must be accountable to public opinion. They 
believed that administrative agencies could augment the popular legitimacy of the 
state by bringing the democratic authority of the executive and the legislature 
together, alongside the direct input of the affected public, in crafting regulatory 
policy. Agencies, in their view, were not to be understood merely on Weber’s 
terms as efficient implementers of clearly identified legislative ends, but rather as 
engaged participants in the specification of indeterminate public norms.  As I will 
show, the intellectual architecture of our administrative state has realized 
significant aspects of the Progressive vision.21 
The original Progressive understanding motivates a reformation of the 
major questions doctrine.  I argue that courts should defer to reasonable agency 
interpretations of statutory ambiguities that implicate major questions if: (1) the 
agency promulgates its interpretation through notice-and-comment rulemaking; 
and (2) the rulemaking addresses the relevant questions of economic and political 
significance the court has identified.  If the interpretation is not promulgated 
through rulemaking, the court should nonetheless give weight to the agency’s 
view proportional to its level of engagement with the affected public, and the 
extent to which it addresses the relevant questions of political and economic value 
in its contemporaneous explanation of its interpretative choice.  This approach 
                                                 
17 See, e.g. K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political 
Economy in the New Guilded Age: Towards A Fourth Wave of Legal Realism? 94 TEX. L. 
REV. 1328, 1337-1345 (2016) (discussing Progressive Era political and legal thought as a 
basis for a new concern with using administration to combat social domination in law 
scholarship). 
18 See, e.g. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 447-78 (2014) 
(identifying the American Progressives as originating our administrative law, and 
indicting their disregard for constitutional principles of the rule of law and democratic 
control of policy decisions). 
19 See, e.g. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 1870–1960 223-25 (1992). 
20 See infra Part IV.A. 
21 See infra Part V. 
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draws on the analysis of U.S. v. Mead Corp22 to determine what level of deference 
should be owed on agency resolution of major questions. But the level of 
deference owed to the agency, in my proposal, turns on the deliberative intensity 
and substantive content of the agency’s interpretative process, rather than, as in 
Mead, the level of delegated lawmaking authority the agency has relied upon to 
promulgate its interpretation. 
This article proceeds in six parts.  In Part I, I trace the development of the 
major questions doctrine as an exception to Chevron deference. In Part II, I 
reconstruct the rationale for the doctrine, arguing that it is best understood as 
reinforcing the non-delegation doctrine and, more fundamentally, deliberative 
democratic control over political choices. In Part III, I argue that the major 
questions rests on auxiliary assumptions that courts are the best interpreters of the 
principles and policies enacted in legislation, and that agencies should serve as 
value-neutral, technocratic implementers of policies decided definitively by courts 
and the legislature.  In Part IV, I suggest an alternative model of administration, 
based on Progressive political thought, which emphasizes the discursive role 
agencies can play in synthesizing expressions of public opinion in the form of 
legislation, presidential input, and public participation. In Part V, I argue that this 
Progressive theory better comports with our current institutional regime than the 
court-centric and technocratic assumptions of the major questions doctrine.  In 
Part VI, I deploy this alternative understanding to propose a revision to the major 
questions doctrine, which relies on the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-
and-comment rulemaking provisions.23  I then demonstrate how this modified 
approach would apply to the major questions cases. 
 
 
I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE: A DEPARTURE FROM THE TRADITIONAL 
REGIME OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
 
In this Part, I introduce the major questions doctrine as an exception to the 
general presumption that agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities are owed 
at least some level of weight or deference.  In section A, I outline the general 
administrative law doctrine of judicial deference to agency statutory 
interpretation.  In Section B, I introduce the major questions cases, describing 
how the doctrine evolved from a presumption against broad delegations through 
marginal statutory provisions into a stand-alone presumption against broad 
delegations concerning politically important matters. 
 
A. The General Principle of Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations 
of Statutory Ambiguities 
 
The major questions doctrine is a departure from the general rule that 
courts will give some degree of weight or deference to agency interpretations of 
the statutes they are charged with administering.  The presumption that agencies 
                                                 
22 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
23 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 §4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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views should be given considerable weight in judicial statutory interpretation goes 
back to the early nineteenth century, before the proliferation of administrative 
tasks had become an issue of major political and legal contention.24  For instance, 
in United States v. Moore,25 the Court stated: “The construction given to a statute 
by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most 
respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons. 
The officers concerned are usually able men, and masters of the subject. Not 
unfrequently they are the draftsmen of the laws they are afterwards called upon to 
interpret.”26  The rule was not absolute, but turned on a set of contextual factors, 
such as the relative determinacy of the statutory norm in question, the continuity 
of agency interpretation, and whether the agency interpretation was nearly co-
original with the organic act itself. Thus in Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. 
United States,27 Justice Cardozo stated that  
 
administrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be 
overturned except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is 
indefinite and doubtful. . . . The practice has peculiar weight when it 
involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged 
with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the 
parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.28   
 
The rule of deference took solidified when the New Deal ushered in a vast 
expansion of national administrative capacities to complement the expansion of 
the constitutional limits on legislative power under the Commerce Clause.29 The 
New Deal framework incorporated the existing principle that agency 
interpretations should be given some weight in judicial statutory interpretation, 
depending upon the subject-matter expertise of the agency, the consistency of its 
position, and the procedural formality by which the decision was issued.30 The 
courts also began to distinguish cases where Congress had allocated primary 
interpretive authority to the agency, rather than the judiciary, to resolve the 
meaning of a statutory term with significant policy implications. In NLRB v. 
Hearst Publications, Inc. the Court defined a space of interpretive discretion in 
which the Board’s definition of “employee” was to be accepted by the Court if 
had “a warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law.”31  Reserving the 
fundamental judicial duty to “say what the law is,” 32  the New Deal Court 
                                                 
24 See, e.g. Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. 206, 210 (1827). 
25 95 U.S. 760 (1877) (internal citations omitted) (upholding the Secretary of the Navy’s 
interpretation of statutory provisions fixing annual salaries for assistant-surgeons). 
26 Id. at 763. 
27 288 U.S. 294 (1933). 
28 Id. at 314. 
29 See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of 
New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399 (2007). 
30 Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
31 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (internal quotations omitted). 
32 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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nonetheless recognized that agency interpretations could guide judicial 
interpretation to varying degrees, depending on the scope of policy-making 
authority Congress intended to dedicate to the agency, and the relevance of 
agency practice, experience, and judgment to the ordinary judicial practice of 
statutory construction.33 This flexible regime of deference was crucial to holdings 
in many of the canonical cases of judicial statutory interpretation, during and after 
the New Deal, such as United States v. American Trucking Association,34 and 
Griggs v. Duke Power.35  
In Chevron U.S.A v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,36 the Court 
temporarily simplified this nuanced regime with its famous two-step procedure.  
Generalizing the approach first developed in Hearst,37 Chevron held that if a 
statutory provision is ambiguous, the courts should generally infer that the 
legislature has delegated the interpretive choice to the administering agency by 
implication.  In such cases, courts should defer to the interpretation of the 
administering agency if it is “permissible” or “reasonable.” 38   The scope of 
Chevron, however, was not entirely clear. 39  Did it refer to any agency 
interpretation, no matter in which procedural form, or did it apply only to 
legislative rules issued through notice-and-comment procedures? Did courts still 
have the responsibility to determine independently possible interpretations of 
ambiguous language as a threshold inquiry?40   Uncertainty and disagreement 
concerning Chevron’s realm of application eventually led the Court to specify the 
forms of agency action to which it applied. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca41 and INS v. 
                                                 
33 See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
6 (1983) (“judicial review of administrative action contains a question of the allocation of 
law-making competence in every case. . . . The court's interpretational task is . . . to 
determine the boundaries of delegated authority”) and Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" is 
Too Confusing—Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1143 (2012) (distinguishing the “weight” courts may give to agency views in 
determining the boundaries of the agency’s interpretative discretion from the “space” in 
which Congress has allocated primary authority to the agency). 
34  310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940) (deferring to opinion of Wage & Hour Division of 
Department of Labor)). 
35  401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (deferring to interpretation of Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission). 
36 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
37 See Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 792 (arguing 
that Chevron “universalized Hearst,” by “creat[ing] a presumption that to the extent any 
statute conferring authority for its administration on a particular agency lacked a fixed 
meaning . . . [t]he uncertainties were to be regarded as delegations to those agencies of a 
responsibility reasonably to choose among the possibilities the statutory language 
offered”). 
38 Id. at 843. 
39 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833 
(2001). 
40 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 
611 (2009). 
41 480 U.S. 421 (1987) 
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Aguirre-Aguirre42 together hold that Chevron applies to interpretations reached in 
the course of binding adjudications as well as those promulgated through 
rulemaking. Christensen v. Harris County43 and United States v. Mead Corp44 
indicate that Chevron does not, however, ordinarily extend to non-binding 
documents, such as opinion letters or guidance documents, that are not 
promulgated in the exercise of the agency’s delegated lawmaking authority. 
Where Chevron does not apply, courts will nonetheless usually accord “some 
deference” 45  to the agency’s interpretation depending on the “thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”46  
There are several other wrinkles to the court’s current framework for 
agency deference, which is better understood as a “continuum of deference,” 
rather than as a set of hard and fast rules, and which has in any event not been 
elaborated or deployed consistently in the case law.47  Here I want to focus on one 
particularly salient and theoretically interesting exception to the general principle 
that at least some level of deference is owed to agency interpretations of the 
statute it administers.   
 
B. The Major Questions Cases: From Keeping Elephants Out of Mouse 
Holes to Keeping Elephants Out of Jungles 
 
In a series of cases, the Court has not deferred to agencies’ statutory 
interpretations where the Court considers the issue to be one of “economic or 
political magnitude.”48  The court presumes that Congress does not impliedly 
delegate to agencies the authority to resolve particularly important matters.  This 
principle has gradually expanded over the course of the cases where it has been 
deployed—from a caution against reading broad powers into narrow language 
into a general presumption that important questions are simply inappropriate for 
agency resolution. 
The major questions doctrine first emerged as a distinguishable technique 
of statutory interpretation in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co. 49  
There, the Court rejected the Federal Communication Commission’s 
interpretation of the filing requirements of the Communications Act of 1934. The 
FCC had issued a rule that interpreted its authority to “modify”50 tariff filing 
                                                 
42 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
43 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
44 533 U.S. 218 (2000). 
45 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995). 
46 Skidmore 323 U.S. 140; Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991). 
47 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083 (2008). 
48 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (2000). 
49 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
50 Communications Act of 1934 §203(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2012). 
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requirements to permit it to waive such requirements altogether for certain 
carriers.  The late Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, first found that the 
agency’s authority to “modify” the requirements did not encompass the authority 
to make a “radical or fundamental change.”51  This was presented as an ordinary 
textual argument, relying on dictionary definitions of “modify,” rather than the 
importance of the interpretive question.52  He then concluded that the broad filing 
waiver was indeed a fundamental change, and thus exceeded the bounds of the 
FCC’s interpretive discretion.  The waiver was “a fundamental revision of the 
statute,” rather than an incremental adjustment, since it withdrew the Act’s crucial 
filing requirements from “40% of a major section of the industry.”53 If these 
premises are valid, this argument resolves the question decisively against the 
agency.  If “modify” connotes a limited administrative authority, then an agency 
cannot make a “major” change in reliance upon that statutory term.  As Justice 
Scalia memorably stated in a later case, “Congress . . . does not . . . hide elephants 
in mouseholes.”54 
But Justice Scalia at one point announces a broader principle, not 
necessary to the holding: “It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the 
determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-
regulated to agency discretion—and even more unlikely that it would achieve that 
through such a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements. . . 
.”55 This dictum inaugurates the major questions doctrine.  Here, Scalia is not 
merely suggesting that the FCC’s “major” change in filing requirements is an 
impermissible expansion of the plain meaning of “modify.”  Rather he presumes 
that Congress would not in any event authorize an administrative agency to make 
decisions of major economic import without an express delegation of such 
authority.   
This presumption became central to the holding in FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson.56 In that case, the Court declined to grant Chevron deference to the 
FDA’s rule interpreting the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to permit it to 
regulate nicotine, cigarettes, and smokeless tobacco.  Specifically, the FDA 
maintained that nicotine could be regulated as a “drug,” defined as “an article 
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body”; and 
that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco could therefore each be regulated as a 
“device,” meaning in relevant part “an instrument, apparatus, implement, 
machine, contrivance . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body.”57  The court rejected the FDA’s interpretation. Though the Court might 
                                                 
51 MCI, 512 U.S. at 229. 
52 Id. at 225-29. 
53 Id. at 232, 231. 
54 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), citing MCI, 512 
U.S. at 231, and Brown & Williamson, 429 U.S. at 159-60. 
55 Id. at 231.  
56 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
57 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 §201, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321 (g), (h) (2012). 
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ordinarily defer to the FDA’s reasonable interpretation of “drug” and “device,”58 
it reasoned that  
 
this is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its representations before 
Congress, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate a significant 
portion of the American economy. . . . We are confident that Congress 
could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and 
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.59   
 
Relying on MCI, the Court established a presumption against Chevron-
style implied delegation where a major question is concerned.  But whereas in 
MCI the Court found that the plain meaning of the term “modify” indicated that 
the FCC could not make a major amendment to the regulatory scheme under that 
provision, in Brown & Williams the terms “drug” and “device” plainly 
comprehend “nicotine” and “cigarettes,” respectively, as a matter of English 
usage.  The doctrine therefore morphs in Brown & Williamson into a general 
presumption against implied delegation where the Court independently 
determines that the issue was simply too significant to be left to the agency. 
Above and beyond the traditional tools of statutory construction, the major 
question doctrine therefore provides additional grounds for delimiting the scope 
of agency authority.60  Where the Court concludes that the agency has made an 
important policy decision under ambiguous legislative authority, the Court will 
not defer, but rather take on the interpretive task itself. 
Two subsequent cases confirmed that the major questions doctrine was not 
a fleeting aberration, but a persistent, if sparingly invoked, element of the Court’s 
                                                 
58 See Jody Freedman and Adrian Vermeule, From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. 
REV. 51, 73 (2007) and Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: 
The Norm of Agency Continuity, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 335, 358-359 
(William N. Eskridge Jr. et al., eds. 2011). 
59 Brown & Williamson, 512 U.S. at 159. 
60 In Brown & Williamson, Justice O’Connor offers three separate arguments to conclude 
that Congress had spoken to the precise question at issue, and thus Chevron deference 
was unwarranted: (1) she first combines a “whole act” argument—the FDA would have 
to ban cigarettes from the market if it regulated them as a device—with a “whole code” 
argument—other statutes evince Congress’ intent to regulate cigarettes rather than to ban 
them—to argue that Congress could not have intended for the FDA to regulate cigarettes; 
(2) She then argues that Congress had “acted against the backdrop of” and thus “ratified” 
the agency’s previous position that it did not have authority to regulate nicotine or 
cigarettes when it enacted other statutes regulated tobacco.  Id. at 144.  (3) She finally 
argues, separately, that the economic and political significance of regulating cigarettes 
indicate that Congress did not delegate this regulatory choice to the agency.  The “major 
questions” argument is thus one of three independent strands that together support the 
Court’s conclusion that Congress did not impliedly delegate interpretative discretion to 
the agency with regards to cigarettes.  Though the major questions issue is just one prong 
of the Chevron-step-one analysis here, it is analytically distinct, and was thus positioned 
to stand on its own as grounds to withhold deference from an implementing agency. 
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deference regime. In Utility Regulatory Air Group v. EPA, 61  the doctrine 
formalized in Brown & Williamson supported the Court’s finding that the EPA’s 
greenhouse gas emissions standards and permitting requirements for motor 
vehicles impermissibly interpreted the Clean Air Act.  Citing MCI and Brown 
&Williamson, Justice Scalia reasoned that “EPA's interpretation is . . . 
unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and transformative 
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional 
authorization. . . . We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an 
agency decisions of vast “economic and political significance.” 62   As I will 
discuss in the next section, this language is one of the strongest formulation of the 
major questions doctrines, implying that it might take the form of a clear 
statement rule. 
In Gonzales v. Oregon,63 the Court deployed the major questions doctrine 
somewhat differently.  In that case, the doctrine helped to determine the amount 
of weight owed to Attorney General’s Interpretive Rule issued under the 
registration provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, which proscribed the use 
of certain drugs used in physician-assisted suicide.  Citing Brown & Williamson, 
the Court reasoned that the Interpretive Rule did not fall under the Chevron 
framework, because Congress would not have delegated authority over an issue of 
such political significance through the statute’s registration provisions.  It 
explained: “The importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide, which has 
been the subject of an earnest and profound debate across the country makes the 
oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.”64  Instead, the court 
treated the Interpretive Rule as a non-binding document, which would be 
accorded weight under  Skidmore only to the extent that it had “power to 
persuade.”65  Because the Attorney General lacked any medical expertise relevant 
to the regulation of physician assisted suicide, and because of the “apparent 
absence of any consultation with anyone . . . who might aid in a reasoned 
judgment,” the Rule’s persuasive force was nil.66 
The major questions doctrine was recently deployed and expanded by the 
Supreme Court King v. Burwell.67  There, the Court declined to defer to the 
Internal Revenue Services’ interpretation of a key provision of the Affordable 
Care Act.  The IRS had interpreted “Exchange established by a State”68 to include 
exchanges established by the federal government, so that health care tax credits 
could be provided through such latter exchanges.69  The Court, citing Brown & 
                                                 
61 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014). 
62 Id at. 2444. 
63 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
64 Id. at 267 (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65 Id. at 268. 
66 Id. at 269. 
67 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
68 26 U.S.C. 36B(b)-(c)(2012). 
69 Internal Revenue Service, Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit. Final Rule, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 23, 2012). 
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Williamson, declined to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the admittedly 
ambiguous provision:  
 
The tax credits are among the Act's key reforms, involving billions of 
dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance 
for millions of people. Whether those credits are available on Federal 
Exchanges is thus a question of deep economic and political significance 
that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that 
question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.70   
 
The court then went on to offer its own construction of the Act without any regard 
to the IRS’ interpretation, analyzing on its overall statutory structure and 
“legislative plan” to conclude that the provision did in fact mean what the IRS 
thought.71   
Note that there is a subtle but significant expansion of the logic in Brown 
& Williamson: the importance of the interpretive question is not presented, as in 
Brown & Williamson, merely as one reason amongst others why the statute should 
not be read to delegate interpretive authority to the agency.  Rather, the great 
weight of the question appears to be a sufficient reason on its own for declining to 
defer.  The use of the major questions doctrine in King is also more expansive 
than in previous cases, because it did not involve a change away from the 
agency’s interpretive status quo, as had been the case with the FDA’s decision to 
regulate tobacco products.  Instead the doctrine was invoked to decline deference 
to the “contemporaneous construction” of a recently enacted statute by an agency 
charged with administering it—a case where great deference would ordinarily be 
particularly appropriate, even before the advent of Chevron. 72  The Court 
nonetheless asserts its interpretive jurisdiction, wresting power away from the 
agency, only to conclude that the agency had been right all along.  The 
disagreement is structural—“who decides?”—rather than substantive—“what is 
the answer?”   
 The most recent high-profile use of the major questions doctrine came in 
Texas v. U.S., 73  where the 5th Circuit upheld the district court’s nation-wide 
injunction on the Department of Homeland Security’s Deferred Action Program 
for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).  The DAPA 
program set out general criteria for DHS immigration enforcement officials to 
consider in deferring removal proceedings for undocumented immigrants, and in 
conferring a status of “lawful presence” that would enable recipients to apply for 
employment eligibility and social security benefits.74 In finding that Texas was 
                                                 
70 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (internal quotations omitted). 
71 Id. at 2496. 
72 Norwegian Nitrogen Products, 288 U.S. at 315. See, also Mead, 533 U.S. at 252 and 
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438–439 (1986). 
73 809 F. 3d. 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
74 Department of Homeland Security, Memorandum from Jeh Charles Jonhson, Director, 
U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Service, for Léon Rodríguez et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), 
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likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to DAPA under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the court found that, beyond the procedural deficiencies of the 
policy, it was substantively beyond the delegated immigration enforcement 
authority of the Department.  To support this argument, the Court relied on the 
major questions doctrine to reject the agencies’ interpretation of the Immigration 
and Nationalization Act. The Court reasoned: 
 
DAPA would make 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens eligible for 
lawful presence, employment authorization, and associated benefits . . . . 
DAPA undoubtedly implicates question[s] of deep economic and political 
significance that [are] central to this statutory scheme; had Congress 
wished to assign that decision to an agency, it surely would have done so 
expressly.”75 
 
Congress, the court reasoned, would not have delegated such vast authority to 
alter immigration policy to an executive agency.  Despite admittedly “broad 
grants of authority”76 to the Secretary of DHS to “establish[] national immigration 
enforcement policies and priorities,”77 the court concluded that the Immigration 
and Nationalization Act could not be construed to grant such policymaking 
discretion to DHS.78  
In this judgment, the major questions doctrine takes on its full potential 
breadth.  Despite capacious statutory terms granting enforcement policy discretion 
to the agency, the court finds that Congress simply could not have meant to vest 
the Secretary of DHS with authority to make such a major change in immigration 
policy without specific Congressional authorization.  One might therefore say 
that, in its most extreme form, the major questions doctrine not only aims to keep 
administrative elephants from emerging from statutory mouse holes, but rather 
aims to take elephants out of the jungle of administrative policymaking altogether.  
Even when Congress explicitly grants broad discretion to agencies, the major 
questions doctrine may deny deference to interpretations that seem, by the court’s 
judgment, to be politically portentous.    
This latest incarnation of the major question presumption remains in force, 
though without the benefit of a Supreme Court opinion grappling with its 
substance. The Court granted certiorari, but ultimately affirmed the judgment by 
                                                                                                                                     
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf 
75 809 F.  3d. at 181. 
76 Id. at 183. 
77 6 U.S.C. § 202 (5) (2012). 
78 The 5th Circuit went on to use the major questions doctrine to find DHS interpretation 
unreasonable under Chevron step two. Assuming arguendo that the agency’s 
interpretation of the INA was not barred at Chevron step one, the court found that the 
interpretation was impermissible at Chevron step two, because it was “an unreasonable 
interpretation that is manifestly contrary” to the INA. Texas v. U.S, 809 F. 3d. at 182.  It 
found that the grant of enforcement policy discretion to the Secretary could not 
“reasonably be construed as assigning decisions of vast economic and political 
significance, such as DAPA, to an agency.”   Id. at 183. 
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an equally divided court.79  The next step in the evolution, or devolution, of the 
doctrine may have to await a full complement of Justices. 
 
 
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE RATIONALE FOR THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE: 
FROM NON-DELEGATION TO POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
 
In this part, I describe the legal and normative justification for the major 
questions doctrine. None of the cases where the major questions doctrine arises 
actually explain the reason for it.  Why should courts presume that Congress does 
not delegate interpretative authority to agencies on important issues?  Bracketing 
the question how precisely we are to distinguish questions that are “major” from 
those that are “minor” or “interstitial,” why should we suppose that Congress 
would not assign such issue of economic and political magnitude to the judgment 
of administering agencies?  Scholars have offered, and in some cases endorsed, 
several different rationales for the doctrine, including combatting agency 
aggrandizement,80 supporting the under-enforced constitutional principle of non-
delegation, 81  enforcing legislative supremacy, 82  and avoiding administrative 
interference with public deliberation.83 In this section I will specify the doctrinal 
status of the major questions doctrine as a presumption that buttresses the under-
enforced constitutional norm of popular sovereignty. The principles of non-
delegation, legislative supremacy, and deliberation inducement that have been put 
forward in defense of the doctrine each protect democratic legitimacy at different 
levels of its institutionalization—the people’s allocation of constitutional power, 
                                                 
79 U.S. v. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016). 
80 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL' Y 203, 261 (2004) and Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling 
Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1015-16 (1999) and Merrill & 
Hickman, supra note ___, at 844-45. 
81 See John M. Manning, The Non-delegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 224-27 (2000) and Jacob Loshin and Aaron Nielson, Hiding Non-
delegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 26-33 (2010). 
82 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron 
Deference as a Doctrine of Non-Interference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It 
Wrong), 60 ADMIN L. REV. 593 (2008) and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding 
Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of 
Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 411, 436 (2013) (“When 
an agency such as the FDA makes a major policy move on its own, without sufficient 
mooring in a congressional authorization, it undercuts the democratic legitimacy of 
statutes.”). 
83See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761 
(2007) (“the Court withheld deference because the respective administrations—agency 
heads, key White House officials, or even the President himself—although electorally 
accountable, had interpreted broad delegations in ways that were undemocratic when 
viewed in the larger legal and social contexts.”) and WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. AND 
JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 287-9 
(2010). 
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the special status of Congress as a democratically accountable institution, and the 
protection of the ongoing process of public discourse that tethers governmental 
action to the commitments of the public sphere. This democratic vision supposes 
that major value choices must be made in a transparent, accountable, inclusive, 
and deliberative fashion.  In section A, I specify the status of the major questions 
doctrine as a statutory presumption that reinforces the constitutional norm of non-
delegation.  In section B, I relate the non-delegation doctrine to a deeper 
democratic norm that fundamental questions of principle and policy must be 
settled in a transparent and rational deliberative process that includes members of 
the affected public.  
 
A. The Doctrinal Status of the Major Questions Rule: Reinforcing Non-
delegation Through Statutory Interpretation 
 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court turned to “substantive canons” of 
statutory interpretation as a means of enforcing its conception of constitutional 
values.84  Substantive canons, such as the requirement that Congress must make 
its intention absolutely clear if it wishes to alter the balance of state and federal 
powers,85 allow the courts to police constitutional structural norms without taking 
the aggressive step of striking down unconstitutional legislation. 86   Such 
substantive canons encompassed administrative interpretations of statutes, such as 
when the court rejected the National Labor Relations Board’s decision to exercise 
jurisdiction over certain religious schools in order to avoid constitutional conflict 
between the National Labor Relations Act and the First Amendment.87   
Amongst the constitutional values the Court sought to protect with its 
substantive canons was the non-delegation doctrine.  In Mistretta v. United States, 
where the Court upheld Congress’ delegation of authority to promulgate 
sentencing guidelines to a judicial commission, the Court noted in a footnote that 
“In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has 
been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to 
giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be 
thought to be unconstitutional.”88  The Court cited Industrial Union Dept. AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,89 where it had rejected the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)’s benzene exposure standards in part 
for failure adequately to quantify the carcinogenic risk posed by benzene.  Justice 
Stevens reasoned in his plurality opinion that  “In the absence of a clear mandate 
                                                 
84 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 275-308 (1994). 
85 See, e.g. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Will v. 
Mich Dep’t of State Police 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 
(1991). 
86 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 712-48 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing and critiquing 
constitutional avoidance canons and clear statement rules). 
87 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
88 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n. 7 (1989) 
89 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give the 
Secretary the unprecedented power over American industry that would result from 
the Government's view.”90  The Court went on to reason that if OSHA were 
correct that the Act did not compel a quantification of the risk posed by benzene, 
“the statute would make such a ‘sweeping delegation of legislative power’ that it 
might be unconstitutional under the Court's reasoning in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. A construction of the 
statute that avoids this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored.”91  
In his concurrence in the judgment, Justice Rehnquist would have found the 
statute to be an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking power, since he read the 
statute not to provide adequate guidance to OSHA in developing its exposure 
standards.92 
This case provides the clearest precedent for the major questions 
doctrine, 93  and links it definitively to the non-delegation doctrine. In Utility 
Regulatory Air Group Justice Scalia cites the plurality opinion in American 
Petroleum Institute, 94  for the proposition that “We expect Congress to speak 
clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and 
political significance.”95 This reference indicates that Justice Scalia might have 
understood the major questions doctrine as a principle of constitutional avoidance: 
statutes should be construed so as not to grant agencies broad and ill-defined 
powers, which might trespass on the non-delegation doctrine. 
 The difficulty with this strong interpretation of the major questions 
doctrine as it stands today is that the non-delegation doctrine itself is exceedingly 
difficult to violate.  Justice Scalia himself recently confirmed the capaciousness of 
permissible delegation Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,96 where he 
held that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 did not violate the non-
delegation doctrine by authorizing the EPA to promulgate air quality standards 
“the attainment of which . . . are adequate to protect the public health” within “an 
adequate margin of safety.” 97   Since the non-delegation doctrine has not 
                                                 
90 Id. at 644. 
91 Id (internal citations omitted). 
92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
93  I do not include American Petroleum Institute amongst the major questions cases 
described in Part I, infra, because it predates Chevron, and therefore does not analyze 
issues of statutory ambiguity in the way that all of the other major questions do—using 
the doctrine to undercut the Chevron presumption that any statutory ambiguity should be 
construed as granting a degree of deference or weight to the administering agency’s 
interpretation.  On the disjunction between the approach in American Petroleum Institute 
and Chevron, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of 
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 311 (1988) (“If 
the Supreme Court had adopted the Chevron test before it decided Benzene . . . the Court 
probably would have resolved [the] case with a single unanimous opinion”). 
94 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
95 134 S.Ct. at. 2444. 
96 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
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succeeded in invalidating legislation since the 1930s,98 it seems highly unlikely 
that statutes granting agencies authority to decide questions of economic or 
political importance would actually be found unconstitutional.  In cases where the 
statute would in fact survive a constitutional challenge, the canon of constitutional 
avoidance does not apply.99   
The major questions doctrine might nonetheless be seen as a clear 
statement rule, which requires that Congress state its intent unambiguously if its 
wishes to alter, impact, or intrude upon some constitutional value.  Unlike a canon 
of constitutional avoidance, a clear statement rule does not suppose that a certain 
reading of the statute would fall under a constitutional challenge.  The court has 
enforced clear statement rules even where the scheme would pass constitutional 
muster if Congress made its intent clear. 100   Such rules serve as a “quasi-
constitutional law,” seeking to protect a set of broad constitutional values, such as 
federalism or non-retroactivity, by increasing the costs to Congress of intruding 
upon them.101 They protect “under-enforced constitutional norms” by means of 
statutory interpretation.102  Precisely because the non-delegation doctrine provides 
a politically explosive remedy for unconstitutional action—the invalidation of 
duly enacted federal legislation—courts may choose not to enforce the norm to its 
utmost extent. Instead, they resort to the major questions doctrine to treat 
ambiguous statutes as if they contained an “intelligible principle,” and to divine 
this principle through particularly intensive  exercises of statutory construction. 
In Utility Regulatory Air Group, Justice Scalia suggested that the major 
questions doctrine might indeed have the stature of a clear statement rule: “We 
expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency a questions of 
vast economic and political significance.”103  Tellingly, however, Scalia did not 
state that Congress “must” unambiguously express its intent to assign major 
questions to agency discretion, only that the court “expects” it to.  Similarly, in 
MCI such an implied delegation was described as “highly unlikely”104; in Brown 
& Williamson the Court was merely “confident that Congress could not have 
intended” 105  such an implied delegation; in King, the Court thought that if 
                                                 
98   A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
99 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991). 
100 Compare Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)(Congress must speak clearly 
if it wishes to give state judges protection under the Age Discrimination Act) with Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985)(Congress 
has power under the Commerce Clause to apply labor laws to state employees).  The 
cases are discussed in John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2026-28 (2009). 
101  William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 493 (1992). 
102   Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
103 Utility Regulatory Air Group, 134 S.Ct. at 2444. 
104 MCI, 512 U.S. at 230. 
105 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160. 
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Congress had wished to delegate the question to the agency, it “surely would have 
done so expressly.”   
This language suggests that the major questions doctrine has not quite 
achieved the status of a clear statement rule.  It is only a presumption that other 
evidence might rebut.  In Brown & Williamson, for example, Justice O’Connor 
reached her conclusion that Congress had not delegated to the FCC the implied 
power to regulate nicotine based on several other tools of statutory construction.  
She turned to the structure of the act, the relation of the act to other statutory 
schemes, and congress’ reliance upon previous agency statements to argue that 
FCC did not have such interpretive discretion.  Had these other sources of 
interpretation pointed in another direction—for example, if the FCC had long 
insisted on its power to regulate nicotine, but had declined to do so; or if the 
purpose or structure of the Act allowed the incremental regulation of unsafe drugs 
and devices—the presumption that Congress would not have delegated this 
question to the agency could be rebutted.  Of course, presumptions sometimes 
have a tendency to morph clear statement rules,106 and the opinion in King suggest 
a stronger version of the principle might be in the offing. Should the Court wish 
to, it might in the future elevate the interpretive weight of the major questions 
canon.  
 
B. The Constitutional Justification for the Non-Delegation Doctrine and 
Major Questions Presumption: Democracy-Reinforcement 
 
In the last Part I demonstrated that the major question is a presumption of 
statutory interpretation that aims to reinforce the constitutional non-delegation 
doctrine. In this Part, I will argue that the non-delegation doctrine is itself 
premised not only on some formal conception of vested legislative power, but a 
more substantive concern with ensuring that state action is guided by democratic 
input and public deliberation.  The major questions doctrine must therefore be 
understood according to this broader, democracy-reinforcing rationale for the 
non-delegation doctrine. 
The non-delegation doctrine respects the people’s allocation of 
constitutional power amongst the branches of government.  The Constitution 
provides that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States.” 107   The non-delegation doctrine aims to preserve the 
constitutionally vested jurisdictional rights of congress.  The “constitutional 
rights”108 of Congress are ultimately rooted in the “public rights”109 of the people, 
who are the “the only legitimate fountain of power.”110  The authority of the 
people to distribute power is preserved by holding Congress to certain standards 
of clarity with regards to its legislative product. Congress must “lay down by 
                                                 
106 ESKRIDGE supra note ___, at 283. 
107 U.S. Const. art. I sec. 1. 
108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
109 Id. 
110 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 315 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961), 315. 
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legislative act an intelligible principle,” by which the courts, Congress, and the 
people can determine the legality of administrative action.111     
But the non-delegation doctrine does not merely aim to support the 
people’s fundamental constitutional decision to vest legislative power in one 
particular body rather than another.  Rather, legislation itself is thought to have 
special democratic credentials.  As Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in 
American Petroleum Institute, “the nondelegation doctrine ensures to the extent 
consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of 
social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most 
responsive to the popular will.” 112  The connection between congressional 
legislation and democracy is deeply rooted and widely shared across ideological 
and theoretical lines in America jurisprudence. As the late Justice Scalia and 
Bryan Garner write, ‘The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative 
enactment.’ And it is made known in no other way.” 113   Felix Frankfurter 
similarly described Congress as “the primary law-making agency in a 
democracy.”114   John Manning calls Congress the people’s “most immediate 
agent.”115  Speaking through Congress, the people make binding claims upon one 
another in the form of statute.   
Theories of statutory interpretation rely on a democratic conception of 
statutory law to justify the notion of “legislative supremacy.”116  The rule of 
legislative supremacy instructs courts that, in matters of statutory rather than 
constitutional interpretation, Congress is the master and courts are the “faithful 
agent.”117  Justice Breyer explains the chain of democratic legitimacy in this way: 
“Legislation in delegated democracy is meant to embody the people’s will . . . 
[A]n interpretation of a statute that tends to implement the legislator’s will helps 
                                                 
111 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
112  Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
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113 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
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to implement the public’s will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution’s 
democratic purpose.”118  The people speak through Congress, and the courts, in 
discerning legislative meaning, determine what rules, principles, and purpose the 
people have prescribed for themselves. Legislation enacted by Congress is thus 
usually understood to be the most proximate expression of democratic will, short 
of the foundational act of constitution-making.    
The constitutional text does not get us all that way to this identification of 
democracy with legislation, however.  The people, through the Constitution, vest 
“legislative powers” in Congress, but the text does not equate legislative power 
with the sovereign will of the people.119 Rather, the tight link between democracy 
and legislation relies upon a set of assumptions about the special demands of 
modern governance and institutional competence of Congress.  First, Congress’s 
institutional capacities investigation, inquiry, and subject-matter specialization, 
enable it to think holistically and purposefully about social problems, rather than 
respond reactively to isolated individual claims brought before the court.120  “It is 
largely for this reason,” Justice Brandeis remarked in International News Service 
v. Associated Press, “that in the effort to meet the many new demands for justice 
incident to a rapidly changing civilization, resort to legislation has latterly been 
had with increasingly frequency.”121  Congress is functionally suited to the kind 
of informed governmental intervention which, at least since the Progressive Era, 
the national public has increasingly expected of its government.122   
Second, the “electoral connection” between Congress and the people 
encourages representatives to behave in a way that will enable them to retain 
office.123  This means they will vote for bills that their constituency thinks are 
wise, would benefit from, or would endorse if enacted.  When legislation garners 
sufficient votes in both houses to be presented to the President for veto or 
signature, there is good reason to believe that the bill is a proximate reflection of 
the needs, interests, and values accepted by a majority of the people themselves.  
The difficulty of clearing legislation through the veto gates in a bi-cameral 
legislatureincrease the likelihood that legislation will be deliberately considered 
before it is enacted, exposed to public critique and input, and refined to respect 
the broad interests of the public as a whole, rather than any particular faction. 124   
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This leads to the conclusion that democratic legitimacy is reinforced when 
Congress makes basic “value choices” in the people’s name.125 As James Willard 
Hurst argues, “A statue embodies a choice of values carrying obligations on those 
within its governance, backed by the force of the state.”126  By making the basic 
value choices that will guide policy, Congress retains normative authority over 
regulatory activity.  The people, acting through Congress as their primary 
institutional agent, thereby retain a claim to self-determined governance. This 
vision associates legislation with the clear enunciation of certain public values 
which the law is meant to further or enforce.   
The major questions doctrine aims to reinforce Congress’ democratic 
responsibilities by assuming it does not leave important value choices to agencies.  
Justice Breyer arguably invented the major questions doctrine in 1986 when he 
argued that “Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major 
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of 
the statute’s daily administration.”127  Framed simply as a matter of legislative 
intent, the major questions doctrine purports to allocate only those questions to an 
agency that a reasonable legislator would want to delegate. But the major 
questions doctrine lays down a generic presumption that is not based in particular 
legislative text, purpose, or history.  Its connection to any specific legislative 
intent is therefore tenuous.128 It is rather a presumption that aims to reinforce 
democratic decision-making by increasing the costs to Congress of impliedly 
delegating significant policy questions—it must do so expressly, if at all.  
Justice Breyer has most recently justified the principle on explicitly 
democratic grounds. He first distinguishes sharply between “democratic” and 
“administrative” decisionmaking: “To achieve our democratically chosen ends in 
a modern populous society requires some amount of administration, involving 
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administrative, not democratic, decisionmaking.”129  The way to avoid “conflict 
between democracy and administration” is to ensure that administration simply 
“compliments” democracy “by implementing legislatively determined policy 
objectives.”130  Democracy on this account means fidelity to policy objectives 
which Congress has laid down. 
By presuming that the reasonable legislator would not want to delegate 
this responsibility, the doctrine encourages Congress to speak with clarity in 
legislation about the basic value commitments it enacts.  It cannot do so through 
ambiguous statutory language, which, under Chevron, would usually constitute an 
implied delegation.  In the event Congress has not explained itself in the ordinary 
and plain meaning of the relevant provisions, the doctrine instructs judges not to 
defer to the agency, but rather to look far and wide to discern such purposes—in 
the broader structure of the Act as well legislative history and other relevant 
statutes that may bear on the question.   
In an age where the more extreme forms of textualism encourage a narrow 
focus on the ordinary meaning of isolated provisions, this interpretive instruction 
pushes the courts back to a more pragmatic, multifaceted, and holistic approach to 
statutory construction.  Thus, Brown & Williamson, Justice O’Connor took an 
unusually broad approach to statutory interpretation, which swept in decades 
worth of post-enactment legislative history and testimony in Congressional 
hearings.  King v. Burwell also illustrates this expansive move, though in far less 
extreme fashion, as Justice Roberts looked to the “broader structure of the act, the 
“statutory scheme,” and the consequences of alternative constructions to 
determine the meaning of the tax credit provision. 131   He acknowledge that 
“reliance on context and structure statutory interpretation is a subtle business, 
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calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering becomes 
creation and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation itself.”132  
But the major questions doctrine had led him down this supposedly treacherous 
path, for fear of the worse alternative that an agency might resolve a question of 
great political moment. He concluded his analysis by emphasizing that “In a 
democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people. Our 
role is more confined—to say what the law is. That is easier in some cases than in 
others. But in every case we must respect the role of the Legislature, and take care 
not to undo what it has done.”133  Democratic principles, on this view, require 
courts to seek out legislative intent with special intensity when they confront 
especially important economic and political issues, over which the pre-eminent 
democratic body ought to retain control.  In this case, the major questions doctrine 
provides a basis on which courts should extend their gaze to the broader legal 
horizon, rather than simply defer to the agency when they confront ambiguity in a 
particular provision. 
This impulse to broaden the interpretive horizon, however, suggests that 
more may be at stake than simple fidelity to the value choices Congress has 
already made in the form of statutes.  The doctrine may also function to safeguard 
and reinforce the broader process of informed and inclusive political discourse 
that underlies and legitimates lawmaking. Some scholars have proposed that the 
doctrine makes the most sense in terms of some version of this deliberation-
reinforcing norm.  Abigail Moncrieff argues that MCI and Brown & Williamson 
are best explained by the fact that the agency action in each case interrupted 
ongoing Congressional deliberations over the topic at issue.134  Lisa Bressman 
similarly argues that in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales the administrative 
agencies in question had undermined democratic accountability by acting contrary 
to legislative preferences and short-circuiting public debate: “the Court’s 
decisions demonstrate that no administration is entitled to disregard Congress’s 
likely preferences or fence out popular consideration of contested issues, no 
matter the reason.”135  Here, the emphasis is not on legislation, per se, but upon a 
broader process of institutional and public debate over the issues the agency 
purported to resolve.  William Eskridge argues in a similar vein that legislation 
has special democratic legitimacy because “the imprimatur of three differently 
constituted electorates guarantees a variety of democratic inputs into national 
policy decisions.” 136  According to Eskridge, it is not merely the democratic 
credentials of Congress itself but the broader deliberations that go on between the 
public and the political branches of government in the run-up to enactment that 
give statutes their special claim to bind.  The integrity of the deliberative 
connection between the public and its government must be preserved by 
preventing agencies from making significant decisions without clear Congress 
authority.   Describing this proposal for “deliberation-inducing judicial review,” 
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Eskridge and John Ferejohn argue that “judges should not defer and should be 
skeptical of agency norm entrepreneurship that pushes superstatutory evolution 
into significant collision with other fundamental norms, unless Congress after 
deliberation and public feedback has authorized such entrepreneurship.”137 
The argument thus far has reconstructed the rationale behind the major 
questions doctrine as one of democracy reinforcement.  It aims to protect and to 
strengthen the connection between the people and governmental action by 
presuming that democratically enacted laws settle major questions of policy.  This 
democratic principle has constitutional, institutional, and deliberative dimensions: 
the people’s constitutional choice to vest legislative power primarily in Congress 
must be preserved; Congress’s special institutional competencies to represent 
electoral constituencies and investigate social problems must be respected; and 
the people’s ongoing deliberative engagement with the government in the form of 
public debate and inter-branch dialogue must be fostered.  To this extent, the 
major questions doctrine rests on sounds principles of democratic 
constitutionalism. In the next section, however, I will argue that the particular 
way the doctrine implements these principles rests on auxiliary assumptions about 
the comparative institutional competencies of courts and agencies. 
 
 
III. WEBERIAN AND COURT-CENTRIC ASSUMPTIONS THE MAJOR QUESTIONS 
DOCTRINE 
 
In this part, I delve deeper into the political theory that foregrounds the 
major questions doctrine.  The doctrine supposes that courts are the primary 
interpreters of statutory values and that administrative agencies should be limited 
to technocratic tasks.  In section A, I will describe the court-centric assumptions 
that support the major questions doctrine.  In section B, I will describe its reliance 
on Weberian conceptions of administration.  In both sections, I will suggest that 
these assumptions are at best controversial. In section IV, I will lay the 
groundwork for a more comprehensive critique of these assumptions by offering 
an alternative Progressive theory of the administrative state. 
 
A. The Legal Process School and Judicial Supremacy in Statutory 
Interpretation 
 
When courts presume that Congress has not delegated interpretive 
authority to agencies to settle major question, they then determine for themselves 
how to resolve the statutory ambiguity. Thus, in Brown & Williamson, the Court 
decided based on its own reading of the statute, without any deference to the 
FDA, that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not permit the Agency to 
regulate tobacco products.  In King v. Burwell, the Court declined to defer to the 
IRS’ interpretation of the tax subsidy provision of the ACA, and instead reached 
the same conclusion as the IRS based on its own reading of the statute. Chief 
Justice Roberts made this structural power-play clear.  Despite the provision’s 
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acknowledged ambiguities, he asserted that “This is not a case for the IRS.  
Instead it is our task to determine the correct reading.”138 
The doctrine therefore rests on the assumption that courts have a superior 
institutional competence over agencies in identifying the implicit value choices 
Congress has made.  This assumption has its roots in some of the classic thinkers 
of the Legal Process School. Lon Fuller, for example believed that “there is 
reason to prefer a form of government which controls moral attitudes less abstract 
than mere respect for the will of the state, and that means, I believe, preeminently 
government by judges.”139  Ronald Dworkin likewise maintained that judges have 
the primary responsibility to interpret the basic purposes expressed in statute, and 
to identify the principles and policies those laws embody.140  He paid scarcely any 
attention to the role of agencies in fleshing out statutory meaning, not even 
considering the possibility that they could resolve questions of principle in the 
exercise of their discretion.  This, he thought, was a task for Hercules. John Hart 
Ely similarly argued for a revival of the non-delegation doctrine on the grounds 
that democratic accountability could only be preserved if Congress retained its 
responsibility for making the basic normative decisions in the form of statutes.141   
As we have seen, the major questions doctrine implements this concern 
about delegation in an altered form, presuming that Congress would not have quit 
its deliberative-democratic duties by implication.  The major questions cases are 
therefore best understood as a way to reassert the primacy of courts over agency 
as the primary interpretive agents of Congress.  As Professor Abbe Gluck has 
observed, King is only the latest case in which the Court has returned to the 
confident purposive spirit of the Legal Process School, cabined the deferential 
posture of Chevron, and sought to reinvigorate an interpretive partnership 
between Congress and the Courts, rather than Congress and the Executive, in 
regulatory law: “This Court seems to want the big questions for itself.”142 
On first blush, this deeply rooted court-centric assumption seems non-
problematic. Marbury, after all, established that “[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”143  But recall that 
Marbury also drew a distinction between administrative actions that were “only 
politically examinable,” and those that were subject to a non-discretionary, 
statutory duty, and could thus be compelled by a writ of mandamus. 144  
Administrative law aims to determine precisely how statutes allocate interpretive 
authority between agencies and courts, acknowledging that some questions of 
statutory interpretation involve political questions which agencies, rather than 
courts, ought to decide in the first instance.145 Chevron’s deference regime rest on 
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the premise that “federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to 
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”146  
The major questions doctrine is controversial because it wrests interpretive 
authority away from the agency in precisely those cases that the court recognizes 
have “economic and political” rather than simply “legal” significance.  It arises in 
cases where the statutory text is acknowledged to be ambiguous, and thus any 
construction of the Act will rely upon some policy considerations that are not 
purely matters of law.  In King, for example, after refusing to defer to the IRS, 
Chief Justice Roberts was put in the awkward position of departing from his 
textualist colleagues to argue that “Exchange established by a State” must 
encompass a federal exchange, because a contrary reading “could well push a 
State's individual insurance market into a death spiral.” 147  As Justice Scalia 
observed, this aspect of the Court’s argument necessarily involved policy 
judgments about the “extrinsic circumstances” in which the law would operate.148  
“This Court holds only the judicial power—the power to pronounce the law as 
Congress has enacted it. We lack the prerogative to repair laws that do not work 
out in practice.” 149  By asserting judicial prerogatives to resolve matters of 
economic and political significance, the major question puts courts, rather than 
agencies, in the front line position of determining how to make statutory schemes 
workable.  The court therefore asserts supremacy over politically-accountable 
administrative actors in resolving legal questions that must be answered at least in 
part by consideration of policy. 
  
 
B. The Weberian Assumptions of the Major Questions Doctrine 
 
Alongside the court-centric assumptions of the legal process school, the 
major questions doctrine rests on an normative institutional assumption that 
administrative agencies have a purely technical task to perform, and should not 
answer questions of significant political value.  This view is rooted in Max 
Weber’s seminal theory of bureaucracy and legal authority. According to Weber, 
the “bureaucratic administrative staff” is the “purest type of exercise of legal 
authority,” because in a system of perfect bureaucratic hierarchy and 
accountability, public officials neutrally and efficiently apply the abstract norms 
of statute to the facts of particular cases. 150  Bureaucracy was a form of 
“domination through knowledge,” which implemented the law through a system 
of hierarchical command and technocratic competency. 151   Bureaucracy, he 
argued, is “capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this 
sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human 
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beings.”152  While regulatory laws might advance certain “substantive” values, the 
state bureaucracy would employ a purely “instrumental” or “purposive” 
conception of rationality (zweckrational), attempting to find the best formal 
means to achieve those pre-given ends.153  This descriptive view of bureaucracy 
led to Weber’s sharp normative distinction between the vocation of political 
officials and the vocation of administrative officials.  Political officials were 
responsible for making decisive value choices in a world of moral and ethical 
pluralism; these value choices would be embodied in statutory law; bureaucrats 
then should only engage in “impartial administration,” serving as the neutral, 
obedient, efficient instruments for realizing the value choices made by 
democratically accountable representatives.154   
This view of administration has had lasting influence in political and legal 
theory.  Jürgen Habermas, the foremost proponent of deliberative democratic 
theory, famously argued that “there can be no administrative production of 
meaning.” 155   Administration was a purely technical, instrumental enterprise, 
which always risked sapping the social life-world of its reservoirs of cultural 
meaning and ethical commitments.  Political discourse, on his view, is exclusively 
something that takes place within the public sphere and in the relationship 
between the public sphere and the legislative process. In Between Facts and 
Norms, which synthesized American and German constitutional theory, he argued 
that “The norms fed into the administration bind the pursuit of collective goals to 
pre-given premises and keep administrative activity within the horizon of 
purposive rationality.” 156   Relying on Ely’s theory of democracy-reinforcing 
judicial review, Habermas argued that the role of the judiciary is then to safeguard 
this non-administrative process of democratic will-formation from bureaucratic 
usurpation.157 
American legal scholars and jurists also often rely explicitly upon 
Weberian premises.  As Professor Louis Jaffe noted, the seminal administrative 
law scholarship of Ernst Freund and James Landis relied upon Weberian theories 
of legislatively authorized, expert administration. 158  Professor Edward Rubin 
deploys Weber’s theory of bureaucracy to argue that administrative law should 
focus exclusively on the “instrumental rationality” of administrative action, rather 
than on public participation.159  Professor Jerry Mashaw likewise adopts Weber’s 
view that administration is fundamentally a matter of “exercising power on the 
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basis of knowledge.”160  Using Weber’s precise phraseology, Mashaw argues that 
“[a]gency implementing action is an instrumentally rational exercise,” in the 
sense that agencies must interpret the goal established by the statute and then find 
the best “instruments” to achieve those purposes.161 
This view of bureaucracy is evident in some Supreme Court cases striking 
down agency action as “arbitrary” and “capricious” under the APA. 162   For 
example, in State Farm,163 the Court struck down the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration’s rescission of a passive restraint rule for failure to draw a 
“rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” 164  In 
Michigan v. EPA, 165  it struck down the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
decision to regulate pollution from power plants because of its failure to perform 
a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether such regulation was “appropriate and 
necessary.”166  In these cases, reasoned administrative decision-making is equated 
with Weberian instrumental rationality.  The agency’s sole task is to find the most 
efficient, cost-effective means to achieve the ends established by statute, weighing 
technological feasibility as well as economic effects.  As Professor Kevin Stack 
has demonstrated, this conception of administrative reason as “means-ends 
rationality” is anchored in the legal process school’s purposivist approach to 
statutory interpretation.167  The agency’s reasoning process, in this view, must be 
completely confined to achieving the goals provided for in its organic act.  There 
is thus a deep affinity between the legal process school’s traditional court centric 
emphasis,168  and the Weberian conception of administration.  If agencies are 
restricted to purely instrumental reasoning, rather than value-based consideration 
of questions of political significance, courts have the exclusive responsibility to 
determine the value choices established by statute, and to ensure that 
administrative action remains within the horizon of those legislative choices. 
Weberian conceptions also provide a powerful basis for criticism of the 
practices and procedures of American administrative agencies, and the judicial 
review thereof. For example, Justice William Brennan relied on Weber’s account 
of bureaucracy to defend the due process revolution in Goldberg v. Kelly169 as a 
necessary judicial response to our “bureaucratic state’s” failure to respond to “the 
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human realities at stake” in administrative action. 170   Professor Gerald Frug 
indicts “the ideology of bureaucracy” in American administrative law, citing 
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy to guide his critique of the “deceptive” 
judicial effort to justify illegitimate assertions of state power.171 Most recently, 
Professor Jacob Gerson and Jeannie Suk172 have relied on Weber’s description of 
bureaucracy as form of technocratic-legal rationality to criticize the Department 
of Education’s enforcement of Title IX,173 which has required extensive reporting 
requirements and adjudicative procedures within universities to address sexual 
assault and harassment.174  Because campus sex is concerned with “emotion” and 
“passion,” they claim that our Weberian, morally neutral federal bureaucracy 
lacks the institutional competency to address these sensitive and ethically charged 
issues.175  They suggest that “there is a democratic deficit underneath the sex 
bureaucracy,” because Congress would not be likely today to pass legislation 
specifically endorsing the Department’s interpretation of Title IX.176 
This Weberian view of bureaucracy is an implicit premise of the major 
questions doctrine.  As Gerson and Suk’s argument suggest, the Weberian view 
rejects any suggestion that agencies could legitimately make value-laden 
decisions without explicit Congressional authorization of the specific values 
chosen.  It is presumptively inappropriate for a bureaucracy to make such policy 
judgments.  This presumption flows readily from a Weberian conception of 
bureaucracy.  If we follow Weber in treating administrative agencies as limited to 
instrumental rationality, then we must presume that Congress does not permit 
agencies to make value choices—much less value choices concerning matters of 
“vast economic and political significance.”  Instead, they must simply find the 
appropriate means to achieve the value choices Congress has already endorsed, as 
those values have been interpreted by the judiciary. 
Some of the scholars cited above might be skeptical of the non-deferential 
posture of the major questions doctrine, doubting, for example, whether there is 
any justiciable way to distinguish a “major” from a “minor” question of statutory 
interpretation.  But the incorporation of Weberian motifs in administrative law 
scholarship complicates the effort to carve out a space for any non-trivial value 
choices within administrative action. Once one adopts Weber’s description of 
bureaucracy as an efficient instrument of policies and principles established by 
the legislature, there are indeed strong reasons to presume that Congress would 
not have left such choices to agencies. When our prototype of “administration” is 
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a hierarchical organization composed of technically sophisticated but perhaps 
under-socialized experts, it is very unappealing to suppose that such characters 
and institutions might resolve and interpret our political commitments, rather than 
merely find the most technologically feasible and cost-effective means to bring 
them about.  The influence of this strand of Weberian political theory has 
therefore buttressed a strong presumption that norm-setting is a matter for 
legislatures and courts, but not for agencies.   
As the critical assessments of Brennan, Frug, and Gerson and Suk suggest, 
the broader implications of the Weberian conception of administration are 
normatively troubling.  The Weberian view treats administration as an inherently 
alienating, morally-vacant, and purely technocratic aspect of modern governance, 
which undermines the legitimacy of the regulatory state. 177   It treats 
administration as categorically incapable of fulfilling a basic requirement of 
democratic constitutionalism: that laws and policies must be justified to those 
they bind in ways that are genuinely responsive to their dignity, needs, and 
interests. 178    If the Weberian diagnosis of bureaucracy is correct, and the 
Weberian prescription for administrative reason are appropriate, there is little 
hope that bureaucracy will ever be capable of satisfying our desire for a form of 
government that is genuinely responsive to public feedback, ethical values, or 
private autonomy.  
There is reason to doubt, however, whether the Weberian account is 
indeed accurate or desirable.  Weber’s vision of a purely technocratic, formally 
rational administrative state conflicts with an important feature of our institutional 
regime—the fact that agencies often do engage in forms of deliberative, rather 
than instrumental reasoning.179  Whereas instrumental rationality attempts to find 
the best means to achieve a given end, deliberative reason engages multiple actors 
in filling out the content of abstract norms to which all parties assent.180 The 
discursive aspect of administrative practice has not gone altogether unnoticed by 
legal scholars. Professor Henry Richardson, for example, argues that, even though 
agencies must pursue the policies enacted in statute, this process must be (and 
sometimes is) characterized by deliberative, rather than purely instrumental 
reason, as agencies specify statutory norms in value-oriented dialogue with the 
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affected public. 181  Professors William Eskridge and Ferejohn embrace 
Richardson’s conception of administrative reason, and explicitly recognize that 
agencies have a central role to play in deliberation over the public purposes 
advanced in statutes.182  They make clear that administrative deliberation is not 
always simply a matter of finding the best means to implement a clearly defined 
norm, but may also involve practical reasoning over fundamental public values.183  
They give the example of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
guidelines on pregnancy discrimination, which were motivated by Commission 
staff’s interpretation of Title VII’s purpose, the constitutional value of equal 
protection, and broader public norms. 184   After endorsing this deliberative 
exercise, however, they later suggest that the Court had sound, if contestable, 
reasons to reject EEOC’s interpretation in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert185 and 
force Congress to explicitly decide whether discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy was a proscribed form of discrimination.   
 
Judges should not defer and should be skeptical of agency norm 
entrepreneurship that pushes superstatutory evolution into significant 
collision with other fundamental norms, unless Congress after deliberation 
and public feedback has authorized such entrepreneurship.  This 
antideference precept helps explain why the Court in the pregnancy cases 
was unwilling to go along with the EEOC’s expansion of Title VII to 
include a huge new area of employment rules.186   
 
By saying that the anti-deference principle “explains” rather than “justifies” the 
Court’s ruling, the authors signal their ambivalence about a judicial decision 
which overrode an agency interpretation which they believe to have been correct.  
The argument is torn between respecting the deliberative competencies of 
agencies in deliberating over fundamental norms, and an anxiety about normative 
developments that have not been unambiguously authorized by Congress.  They 
retain faith that courts can ensure the integrity of the deliberative process by 
requiring Congress explicitly to resolve important political questions rather than 
delegate those choices to agencies. 
 
The major questions doctrine thus rests on a particular political theory of 
our administrative state: the legislature bears primary responsibility for making 
the value choices that animate governmental action; the judiciary then must 
ensure that the legislature retains that responsibility by presuming that Congress 
does not delegate that task to agencies.  Accounts like Richardson’s, Eskridge and 
Ferejohn’s, however, suggest the reemergence of an alternative theory that I argue 
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better comports with our institutions and the ideological origins of our 
administrative state.  The next section explores that theory as the basis for a 
reformation of the major questions doctrine. 
 
 
IV.  THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
 
This section gives an alternative account of our administrative state which 
is based on the American Progressives original understanding of the state they 
wanted to create.  In Part A, I describe the contested theoretical origins of 
Progressive political thought. In Part B, I describe the Progressive theory.  In Part 
C, I trace the influence of the Progressive theory on the early development of the 
American administrative state. 
 
A. The Contested Origins of Progressive Political Thought: Hegel and 
the Ethical Idea of The State 
 
 It is widely recognized that the American Progressives were the founding 
fathers and mothers of our administrative state.187  But the original Progressive 
vision has long been distorted by legal scholars into a technocratic vision of 
administrative expertise.188  Progressive political thought has begun to receive 
renewed attention from legal scholars aiming to reinvigorate an administrative 
state that will reduce social and economic inequality by democratic means.189  At 
the same time, conservative critics of the administrative state routinely link it to 
the philosophy of the American progressives, and their adoption of German 
conceptions of the state.190  According to scholars like Philip Hamburger, the 
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Progressives introduced dangerous, Germanic conceptions of the state to 
American law and thus undermined Anglo-American constitutionalism. By 
following German public law in supposing that administrators could develop 
binding rules, the Progressives undermined democratic values and the rule of law. 
Such scholarship misunderstands the Progressive conception of 
democratic constitutionalism. The Progressives were indeed influenced by 
German conceptions of administrative power, but, unlike their German cousins, 
they sought to make administration democratically accountable.191 Here, I will 
briefly summarize the Progressives’ reception of German state theory, and their 
democratization of the original German conception. Progressivism, of course, was 
a vast and complicated political movement, which defies a completely 
comprehensive account.192   My reconstruction will single out a set of authors 
who together present a coherent and appealing vision that captures much of what 
is valuable about our current administrative structures. John Dewey, Woodrow 
Wilson, and Frank Goodnow envisioned an administrative state in which 
questions of political value would be fleshed out in dialogue between 
administrators, elected representatives, and the public at large.  Administrative 
agencies would synthesize and operationalize three different instantiation of 
public opinion: legislation, presidential policy preference, and direct involvement 
by affected parties.   
It is true that American Progressives were influenced by German theories 
of administration, but their inspiration was not Weber, but G.W.F. Hegel.193 
Hegel had identified, almost a century before Weber, the importance of 
administrative bodies which were functionally differentiated, hierarchically 
organized, and staffed by expert officials.194  But unlike Weber, who understood 
the state to be a “monopoly on the legitimate means of violence,” 195  Hegel 
understood the state as an embodiment of “concrete freedom,”196 meaning that it 
institutionalized the Enlightenment ideals of individual and collective self-
determination.  This ethical understanding of the state motivated his conception of 
administration in particular.   Drawing on the experience of liberalizing Prussian 
social reform in the early nineteenth century, he argued that an administrative 
state was essential to mitigate poverty, social antagonism, and market failures in 
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the interests of preserving public freedom. 197   But Hegel insisted that 
administration was not merely a matter efficient bureaucratic performance.  
Rather administration was tasked with “upholding legality and the universal 
interests,” and to resolve conflicts between social groups by reference to “the 
higher viewpoints and ordinances of the state.” 198   To accomplish this task, 
administrative bodies and their officials not only needed expertise, but also 
“direct education in ethics and in thought.”199  
Bureaucratic reason was for Hegel a form of substantive, rather than 
purely instrumental, reason. That is to say, he supposed that when administrators 
interpreted abstract legal norms, they would draw on broader public norms and 
social understandings to flesh out their concrete content.200    Hegel’s theory, 
however, was not democratic. Though he endorsed representative government 
within the structure of a constitutional monarchy, he believed public opinion was 
often misguided and ignorant, and so sought to guarantee the public welfare by 
insulating bureaucratic decision-making from its influence. 201   It was in this 
respect that the American Progressives departed from their German forebearers. 
 
B. The Progressives’ Democratic Theory of the Administrative State 
 
The American Progressives embraced Hegel’s idea of an administrative 
state in which appointed public officials would use their expertise and ethical 
judgment to preserve the public interest and to control the excesses of private law, 
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commodity exchange, and industrial organization.202 They thus emphasized the 
need for social legislation to provide goods and services and to protect the public 
against monopoly.203  The overall thrust of this project was succinctly articulated 
by John Dewey and James Tufts:   
 
it is certain that the country has reached a state of development, in which . 
. . individual achievements and possibilities require new civic and political 
agencies if they are to be maintained as realities. Individualism means 
inequity, harshness, and retrogression to barbarism . . . unless it is a 
generalized individualism: an individualism which takes into account the 
real good and effective—not merely formal—freedom of every social 
member.204   
 
Dewey, alongside other Progressives like Woodrow Wilson, and Frank Goodnow, 
therefore followed Hegel in arguing for administrative institutions that would 
provide the material and social requisites for individual freedom on the broadest 
possible scale. 
Unlike Hegel, however, these Progressives were profoundly committed to 
democratic principles.205 In his seminal essay on “The Study of Administration,” 
which inaugurated the American field of public administration at the very advent 
of our administrative state in 1887, Woodrow Wilson cited Hegel and the 
Hegelian public law scholar Lorenz von Stein to argue that administration “is 
raised very far above the level of mere technical detail by the fact that through its 
greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political 
wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress.”206  But Wilson emphasized 
that, when administration tackled such “greater principles” it must be guided by 
public deliberation: “administration in the United States must remain sensitive at 
all points to public opinion. . . . The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and 
self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected 
with popular thought, by means of election and constant public counsel, as to find 
arbitrariness or class spirit out of the question.”207   
The Progressives therefore presumed agencies would implement the laws 
in ways that touched on “great principles” of law and politics, but insisted they do 
so in dialogue with affected persons. Dewey stressed that “[I]n the absence of an 
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articulate voice on the part of the masses . . . the wise cease to be wise,” because it 
is impossible for administrative experts “to secure a monopoly of such knowledge 
as must be used for the regulation of common affairs.”208 Thus, “[n]o government 
by experts in which the masses do not have a chance to inform the experts as to 
their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few. 
And the enlightenment must proceed in a way which forces the administrative 
specialist to take account of the needs.”209  
Dewey defined the state as a “public articulated.”210  The “public” was 
brought into being by the externalities caused by economic activity. But without 
an institutional forum in which to express its problems, the public was 
“unorganized and formless.” 211  In the state, the public was institutionally 
embodied and empowered by political institutions.  Administrative agencies were 
then not merely the best technical means for realizing clearly identified purposes, 
but were part and parcel of the process by which such purposes were identified 
and elaborated. As Professor Elizabeth Anderson explains, “Dewey took 
democratic decision-making to be the joint exercise of practical intelligence by 
citizens at large, in interaction with their representatives and other state officials. 
It is cooperative social experimentation.”212  This democratic notion of the state 
gave administrative agencies a central role to play in the deliberative process, 
rather than placing them outside of politics as an efficient instrument for realizing 
democratic will.  Dewey thus argued on the eve of the New Deal that “The 
problem of social control of industry and the use of governmental agencies for 
constructive social ends will become the avowed center of political struggle.”213  
Administrative agencies would not merely be means for implementing the results 
of political struggles waged in other camera, but would provide  additional fora in 
which to reach provisional settlements over common policy goals.  
Legislation had an important but not exclusive role in guiding 
administrative agencies.  The progressives acknowledged the special 
representative competency of Congress, and thus understood the scope of agency 
action to be framed by legislative enactment.  Frank Goodnow, and who was 
influenced by Hegelian conceptions of administration,214 distinguished between 
legislation as the expression of democratic will, and execution as the deed which 
carried out this will.  He concluded that “Popular government requires that it is 
the executing authority which shall be subordinated to the expressing authority, 
since the latter in the nature of things can be made much more representative of 
the people than can executive authority.”215 But the Progressives did not believe 
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that administrative action was completely determined by the statutory authority 
under which it acted.  As Wilson argued, “The scope of administration is . . . 
largely defined and limited . . . to the laws, to which it is of course subject; but 
serving the State, not the law-making body in the State, and possessing a life not 
resident in statutes.” 216  While agencies were bound by law, they served the 
broader democratic purposes of the state structure as a whole, which might be 
expressed in forms other than statutory enactment.  Public participation in the 
administrative process provided another source of democratic input into 
administrative activity, which would enable administrators to interpret the 
ambiguous provisions of law by reference to the self-understandings of the 
democratic public itself. 
Another source of democratic input was the President.  The Progressives 
were eager to deploy the democratic mandate of the President to energize and to 
guide the administrative state they advocated.217  But they did not believe the 
President should dictate the outcome of administrative proceedings or exercise 
full and pervasive control over the administrative apparatus. Goodnow stated that 
“while . . . in the interest of securing the execution of state will, politics should 
have a control over administration, in the interest of both popular government and 
efficient administration, that should not be permitted to extend beyond the limits 
necessary in order that the legitimate purpose of its existence be fulfilled.”218  The 
President, in other words, ought not to stifle out other sources of democratic input 
by prescribing in full the course of administration to the exclusion of other inputs 
from the public and the judgment of administrators.  Wilson likewise argued that 
the President could serve as a “a spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of 
the country, by giving direction to opinion, by giving the country at once the 
information and the statements of policy which will enable it to form judgments 
alike of party and of men.”219 He would therefore steer administration by bringing 
his rhetorical distillation of public opinion to bear on administrative activity, but 
he would delegate to his cabinet and the agencies substantial authority to 
determine the contents of public policy in consultation with affected groups.   
In this Progressive understanding of the state, judicial review would take a 
fairly restrained form. 220 Frank Goodnow argued that the courts in the early 
twentieth century imperiled administrative efficiency with their de novo review of 
questions of law and fact.  He hoped that: 
 
When we develop an administrative procedure which is reasonably 
regardful of rights, e.g. notice and a hearing to the person affected by the 
administrative determination, it may well be that the courts will change 
                                                 
216 Woodrow Wilson, Notes for Lectures on Administration at the Johns Hopkins, in THE 
PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, VOL. 7 1890-1892, 128, 128-9 (Arthur Link ed., 1969). 
217  Stephen Skowronek, Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A 
Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2087 
(2009). 
218 Goodnow, supra note ___, at 38. 
219 Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (1921 ed., 1908), 76. 
220 Kramer, supra note ___,  at 216. 
	 39
their attitude and come to the conclusion that the changed and complex 
conditions of modern life . . . should have an effect both on the 
constitutional rights of individuals and on the powers and procedures of 
administrative authorities.221  
 
Goodnow therefore believed that internal administrative procedures, rather than 
external judicial review, could serve to protect private rights and guarantee 
conformity with law.  This suggestion dovetailed with Wilson and Dewey’s  
suggestion for administrative proceedings which would bring to bear public 
opinion into administrative deliberations.  Administrative, rather than judicial, 
institutions would be the primary venue for interpreting public purposes left 
ambiguous by legislative enactment. 
 
C. The Influence of the Progressive Theory Through the New Deal 
 
 This democratic theory of administration corresponded to developments in 
legal scholarship and administrative practice during the Progressive Era and 
through the New Deal.  In keeping with the Progressives’ revolt against legal 
formalism, 222  Roscoe Pound assailed the Lochner Court’s “mechanical 
jurisprudence,”223 which had imperiled the early development of administrative 
institutions in the United States.  Pound embraced instead a Hegelian-inspired 
“sociological jurisprudence”224 that would be responsive to the cultural context, 
historical development, political purpose, and practical effects of law rather than 
categorical conceptions of natural law and inflexible constitutional boundaries.  
Judicial doctrines of administrative power moved away from a formalist 
conception of the separation of powers to a functionalist conception, in which 
administrative agencies might engage in “quasi-legislative” activities. 225  
Administrative agencies like the Forest Service began to include the public in the 
administrative process “to reach out for the more timid and modest opinion, and 
for the sifting of the bolder and more aggressive type.” 226   Progressive 
administrators under Woodrow Wilson sought to protect freedom of conscience 
during WWI through “individualized participation in the administrative state.”227   
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The Progressives’ theory of administration served as the ideological 
ferment for the New Deal. In 1927, Felix Frankfurter relied on the “pioneer 
scholarship” of Goodnow to argue that administrative law was of crucial 
importance to democratic governance and individual liberty. 228   Statutory 
programs advancing democratic goals were “conditioned upon rules and 
regulations emanating from enforcing authorities.”229   Recognizing that broad 
statutory delegations left important details to the policy judgment of agencies, he 
emphasized that these “details are of the essence; they give meaning and content 
to the vague contours.”230  The surest protection for democratic constitutionalism 
in the administrative state would not be to retain extensive legislative control, but 
instead to govern administration through a professional civil service, a “spirited 
bar,” and “easy access to public scrutiny.”231  Frankfurter thus presumed that 
agencies would deal with essential questions of economic and political 
significance, and sought to ensure democratic control through a combination of 
bureaucratic professionalism, adversarial legalism, and public input. 
The vast expansion of administrative capacities during the New Deal 
would follow in this Progressive tradition. Under the influence of Dewey’s 
conception of democratic administration, agencies like the Tennessee Valley 
Authority,232  and more radical forms of democratic planning in agriculture233 
aimed to involve the affected public in administrative deliberation over planning. 
New Deal administrative law scholars like Walter Gellhorn argued that such 
Progressive forms of participatory administration served to “democratize our 
governmental processes,” by bringing “the interests and individuals immediately 
affected an opportunity to shape the course of regulation.”234 The Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946 codified the Progressive innovation of public participation 
in executive policymaking with its notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions, 
which require agencies to receive and respond to comments when they proposed 
binding substantive rules.235 
 The Progressive theory that lay the foundation for the New Deal has been 
obscured because of the subsequent growth of anti-statism,236 the equation of 
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democracy with interest-group bargaining, 237  and, later, the rise of economic 
rationality as a hegemonic framework for policy analysis.238 We have therefore 
lost sight of the original Progressive intent that animated the project of American 
state-building. I am suggesting here that we should give this original 
understanding a second look. The Progressives conceived administrative agencies 
as engaging the democratic public in three ways: through the implementation of 
democratically enacted law, through the input of the President, and through 
deliberation with the affected public.  They presumed that agencies would tackle 
important, ethically charged political questions, but they aimed to ensure that they 
would do so in a rational and inclusive fashion.  They were skeptical that the 
courts were the best forum in which to ensure the democratic integrity of state 
action, and thus sought to enhance the democratic credentials of the 
administrative process itself. 
  
V. SUPERIORITY OF THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY TO THE WEBERIAN, COURT-
CENTRIC THEORY 
 
In this part, I argue that the Progressive theory of the state maps onto 
important aspects of our current institutional structure better than the Weberian, 
court-centric theory that supports the major questions doctrine.   This is because 
the Progressive theory acknowledges the fact that agencies resolve important 
value questions, but respects public participation and presidential oversight as 
sources of democratic legitimacy.  In our current administrative state, agencies do 
indeed frequently make decisions that implicate important political, constitutional, 
and ethical values.  But we also have procedures that ensure that the agency 
deliberates with the affected public when it settles such major questions.  In 
section A, I note numerous instances where agencies address questions of 
economic and political significance, which suggests that the major questions 
doctrine conflicts with a significant aspect of administrative practice.  In section 
B, I argue that the President provides additional democratic authority to agency 
statutory interpretation, which can bolster agencies’ claims to address major 
questions.  In section C, I argue that the public input in the rulemaking process 
provides further democratic support for administrative interpretations, especially 
compared with a realistic assessment of the democratic credentials of Congress 
and the Courts.  
 
A. The Agency Practice of Value-Oriented Statutory Interpretation 
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The Progressives anticipated that administrative agencies would not only 
identify efficient means to achieve statutory ends, but also engage into deeper 
normative inquiry about the meaning of those statutory ends in light of broader 
public norms.  Our current institutions reflect this vision. In the post-New Deal 
context, where Congress routinely delegates broad rulemaking power to 
administrative agencies, agencies will often engage with fraught and profound 
questions of public philosophy when they interpret and implement the law.  To 
note a few famous examples: The National Highway and Traffic Safety 
Administration’s travails with passive restraint requirements for auto safety were 
bound up with deeply rooted American sensibilities about motor vehicles as 
embodiments of individual autonomy. 239  The Department of Transportation’s 
approval of highway routes implicated the relative importance of park 
conservation, racial equity, and local economic development.240 The The Supreme 
Court’s development of the novel theory of disparate impact discrimination relied 
upon the interpretations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,241 
which were grounded in the Commission’s considered position that 
discrimination included not only intentional bigotry but a “condition of pervasive 
exclusion.”242 Decisions by the Internal Revenue Service on tax exemptions,243 
and Federal Communications Commission’s decisions on rate increases, 244 have 
implicated constitutional norms of equal protection and statutory norms of 
material gender and racial equality.   
It would be too much to say that questions of political value arise in every 
administrative action.  But nor are such instances anomalous.  Scholarship on 
“administrative constitutionalism” identifies numerous cases where agencies 
explicitly interpret constitutional norms, implicitly interpret constitutional norms 
through statutory interpretation, implement statutes that have come to assume a 
quasi-constitutional status, or develop news understandings of foundational public 
norms in the course of performing their statutory duties. 245   When agency 
interpretations implicate constitutional norms, or more broadly attempt to shift the 
conceptual frame by which to determine whether private conduct is lawful or 
unlawful, they plainly address questions of deep economic and political 
significance. The major questions presumption that Congress does not intend 
agencies to make such decisions thus flies in the face of a common aspect of 
agency practice, which Congress has nowhere generally rejected.  If rigorously 
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implemented, it might prevent agencies from playing the important role they have 
historically in advancing our understanding of the abstract political commitments 
established by statute.  
 
B. Presidential Oversight of Administrative Statutory Interpretation 
 
The Progressives argued that the President had special authority as a 
spokesman for public opinion to guide administrative implementation of statutory 
mandates.  Our case law and institutional structure reflects this vision. In 
Chevron, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the President had an important, 
constitutionally authorized role to play in shaping administrative action:  
 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or 
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the 
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”246   
 
This aspect of the reasoning in Chevron realizes the Progressives’ conception of 
the important role the President plays in guiding administrative discretion 
according to her or his interpretation of public opinion.   
Chevron’s emphasis on Presidential input has been complemented by the 
growth of regulatory review in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.  
Though this process began during the Reagan Administration as an anti-
regulatory, technocratic effort to restrict administrative output,247 it has evolved 
since then into a much more sensitive process in which the public values the 
President endorses—such as “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive 
impacts”—can be invoked by agencies to justify their regulatory course of 
action. 248   Since agencies are required to submit any regulation that has an 
economic impact of $100 million or more to OIRA for review,249 as well as any 
Guidance document with a similar effect,250 most agency interpretations that a 
court could plausibly construe as implicating as “major question” must be 
approved by the White House.  This means that most administrative answers to 
major questions will have the imprimatur of presidential approval, and 
consequently will benefit from the democratic credentials of his office. The 
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practice of Presidential control thus has largely realized the Progressive ambition 
of guiding administration according to the President’s distillation of public 
opinion. 
The Progressive theory of administration does not go so far as some 
presidentialist theories of administration in privileging presidential political 
control over statutory control,251 or in supposing that any of the president’s policy 
preferences could justify agency decisions if stated in a public-regarding rather 
than purely partisan way.252   Recall that Goodnow and Wilson’s Progressive 
vision of the President was as a relatively passive Chief Executive, who would 
guide administration according to public opinion, but give significant policy 
autonomy to agency heads and administrative judgment.253  This vision comports 
much more with Professor Peter Strauss’ understanding of the president as an 
“overseer” of administration, rather than a “decider” of administrative policy.254  
Unless legislation directly confers authority to the President, rather than to a 
secretary of an executive department or an independent administrative body, the 
President’s policy preference should have only influence, rather than binding 
authority, on the administrative decision-maker.  Moreover, if an agency wishes a 
court to take the President’s input seriously in determining the democratic 
credentials of its statutory interpretations, this input must be presented in a way 
that is consonant with the statute’s purposes.255   Any more extreme form of 
presidential administration would turn administrative agency’s delegated 
lawmaking authority into opportunity for arbitrary assertions of presidential will. 
The Progressive theory acknowledges that agencies are engaged 
participants in a process of inter-branch deliberation between the Executive and 
the Legislature over the meaning of the laws that goes well beyond the 
Congressional lawmaking process and legislative enactment.  It therefore 
accommodates Jerry Mashaw’s finding that agencies are more willing than courts 
to take into account “political struggles and political context” in their 
interpretation of statutes, since “agency use of this ‘political’ material is a part of 
maintaining their democratic legitimacy. It is precisely their job as agents of past 
congresses and sitting politicians to synthesize the past with the present.”256 
The President’s constitutionally vested, judicially recognized, and 
administratively institutionalized power to bring her understanding of public 
values to bear on agency decisions falls away in the major questions cases 
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entirely.  For example, in Brown & Williamson, it did not matter to the Court, that 
the President had taken public ownership of the Agency’s decision to regulate 
tobacco.  In the major questions cases, the court narrows its focus to statutory 
meaning alone, while ignoring the possibility that administrative agencies might 
draw deliberative democratic authority from the input of the President. 
 
C. Agency Deliberation with the Affected Public  
 
The Progressives argued that the public must be involved in the 
administrative process to ensure its democratic legitimacy.  Our current 
institutions reflect this to a significant degree. Notice-and-comment rulemaking 
has often been defended according to its ability to reinforce the deliberative 
democratic legitimacy of administrative action. Kenneth Culp Davis, for instance, 
observed that  
 
one of the greatest inventions of modern government. . . . Affected parties 
who know facts that the agency may not know or who have ideas or 
understandings that the agency may not share have opportunity by quick 
and easy means to transmit the facts, ideas, or understandings to the 
agency at the crucial time when the agency’s positions are still fluid. The 
procedure is both democratic and efficient.257  
 
The notion here is that notice-and-comment rulemaking can parallel the 
legislative process “in microcosm,” by creating a deliberative process between 
agency officials and the affected public.258  Courts then police this process by 
ensuring that agencies draw reasonable conclusions from the comments they 
receive, address all significant comments, and ensure that all major policy choices 
are sufficiently “ventilated.”259  The democratic function of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking was succinctly summarized by Judge McGowan of the D.C. Circuit in 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle: “if the Agency, in carrying out its essentially 
legislative task, has infused the administrative process with the degree of 
openness, explanation, and participatory democracy required by the APA, it will 
thereby have negate(d) the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the 
formulation of rules.”260   Notice-and-comment rulemaking thus is capable of 
institutionalizing the American Progressives’ core concern with developing a 
participatory administrative process that engages the affected public in grappling 
with questions of political value that have not been unambiguously settled by 
legislative enactment.  
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To be sure, the notice and comment process is not an ideal deliberative 
process. The comment period itself may be a kind of “Kabuki theater,” in the 
sense that it is “a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the 
essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues,”261 such as 
hearings and informal consultations. Stylized or not, however, the underlying 
dynamics of deliberative engagement are no less real. The default participation 
requirements for rulemaking in the APA formalize, and render judicially 
reviewable, a broad process of stakeholder engagement in our administrative 
state. 262 This process has become even more widely accessible with the advent of 
e-rulemaking.263 American administrative law requires a much higher level of 
judicially reviewable public participation in rulemaking than other liberal 
democracies, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and the European Union as 
a whole. 264  The major questions doctrine does not even acknowledge that 
agencies engage in this uniquely American deliberative-democratic process. With 
its exclusive emphasis on legislation as a source of democratic accountability, the 
major question questions doctrine denies these aspects of the rulemaking process 
entirely.   
It might be argued that, because of significant inequalities of participation 
and influence in the administrative process,265 participatory rulemaking does not 
in fact add any democratic legitimacy to administrative interpretations of statutes. 
But the democratic credentials of the administrative process must be understood 
in comparison to the other institutions that might resolve major questions.  
Inequality of influence is, unfortunately, endemic to our entire political process, 
including Congress.266  If significant degrees of inequality of public influence 
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were completely fatal to democratic legitimacy, Congress would have no 
democratic authority to legislate.  The major questions doctrine would therefore 
not serve a democratic function by incentivizing Congress to resolve major policy 
disputes.   
Moreover, the major questions doctrine gives the judiciary the primary 
responsibility to settle major questions if the statutory text is ambiguous.  
Especially in a context where Congress is not likely to correct the judiciary’s 
interpretation of a “major” ambiguity,267  the doctrine functions to empower the 
courts, rather than Congress. Courts are not well geared to democratic forms of 
participation, because their primary function is to adjudicate cases and 
controversies, and protect the rights of individuals and minorities, rather than to 
settle polycentric policy-disputes. 268  Limits on standing to challenge 
administrative action also create inequalities of judicial access between regulated 
parties and public interest organizations, since public interest organizations have 
more difficult showing a concrete and particularized harm to a legally protected 
interest than does the regulated community.269  Because major questions doctrine 
merely empowers the judiciary, rather than Congress or agencies, to resolve major 
questions, it therefore does not promote a comparatively more democratic form of 
policymaking than would exist absent the doctrine’s constraint on administrative 
discretion.   
Worse still, the major questions doctrine exacerbates inequalities in 
rulemaking rather than redressing them.  Because the doctrine generally forbids 
agencies from making decisions of economic and political significance, it 
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incentivizes agencies to explain themselves in technocratic terms, even if 
significant questions of value are at issue.  If agencies know that courts will 
decline to defer to them if they detect agency consideration of important questions 
of political value, they will invariably explain their interpretations of statutory 
ambiguities in a way that makes them appear purely technical. Inequalities of 
influence are at their height when the rulemaking concerns such apparently 
technical, rather than normative, questions, because regulated groups tend to have 
the most nuts-and-bolts information about the relevant subject-matter. 270  The 
technocratic method of review established by State Farm already encourages 
agencies to explain themselves in value-neutral, quasi-scientific policy discourse 
which is difficult for the lay public to access, participate in, and influence.271  The 
major questions doctrine doubles down on this trend by barring agencies from 
engaging in anything more than interstitial gap-filling between clearly established 
statutory norms. The doctrine thus is likely to increase inequalities in the 
rulemaking process, shifting it further into a technocratic rather than value-
oriented form of policy discourse.  This retreat into technocracy will further 
imperil democratic transparency, because important value choices will be kept 
from public view, and dressed up in the supposedly neutral language of expertise.  
 
D. Major Questions as an Obstacle to Efficient Pursuit of the Public 
Interest 
  
 The major questions doctrine does not acknowledge the substantive 
importance of efficient bureaucratic performance in a democratic state.  Recall 
that the Progressives were motivated to build and legitimate an administrative 
state because they wanted to furnish the requisites for public freedom, as such 
requirements were understood by the democratic public.  They believed that 
administrative agencies had the institutional capacity to bring public power to 
bear efficiently and on a massive scale to further social emancipation. The major 
questions doctrine shows the perils of privileging legislative control without due 
regard for this practical need of speedy administrative resolution of social 
problems.  In Brown & Williamson, the FDA was attempting with its tobacco and 
cigarette regulations to mitigate a public health crisis which caused the death of 
400 thousand Americans every year.272  The court acknowledged the force of this 
concern, but nonetheless struck down the rule as outside of the agency’s statutory 
authority.  The laudable interest in ensuring that the public effectively deliberates 
over the commitments that guide state action in this instance delayed an urgent 
intervention into a serious public health issue.  The balance between deliberative 
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integrity and efficient protection of the public interest therefore has not been 
struck with the major questions exception to agency deference.   
The Progressive conception of the state thus comports with salient and 
normatively significant aspects of our current state structure in a way that the 
major questions doctrine and its attending political theory does not. Agencies 
engage with conventional sources of statutory interpretation, alongside a wider set 
of politically sensitive tools that serve the same underlying purpose: to articulate 
public opinion in the form of political action.  Unless courts respect the wide 
ambit of agencies’ deliberative and interpretive competencies, they are liable to 
frustrate rather than to bolster the democratic credentials of the state as a whole. 
 
VI. REFORMING MAJOR QUESTIONS 
 
The major questions doctrine rests in part on the important constitutional 
principle that basic value choices should be subject to public input, scrutiny and 
critique.  But it then imports other auxiliary assumptions to conclude that the best 
way to enforce such a deliberative process is for courts to presume that Congress 
would not delegate such questions to agencies.  The doctrine assumes that the 
judiciary is the preeminent interpreter of Congress’ choices of principle and 
policies, and that agencies should be restricted to the purely instrumental task of 
implementing these definitively established goals.  I have suggested that this 
vision of the administrative state is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively 
appealing.  I repaired to the American Progressive’s democratic conception of 
administration to argue that agencies can play an important role in public 
deliberation about value choices.  Legislation, in this view, is not the sole legal 
repository in which public value choices are to be found.  Statutes are one 
important part of a process of inter-branch dialogue and public discourse over the 
content of public purposes. Chevron acknowledged that many important questions 
of policy are simply not determined by statute, and thus must be fleshed out with 
the input of the president, administrators, and the affected public.  The major 
questions doctrine shuts out these non-Congressional and non-statutory sources of 
public input and accountability, and forces agencies into a purely technocratic 
mode of explanation that belies the normative character of many of their 
determinations.  We therefore need a better doctrine which recognizes the 
important interest in reinforcing deliberative democratic governance in 
administrative law, but which does not trade on dubiously inflated notions of 
judicial competence and deflated conceptions of administrative agencies’ ethical 
capacities.  In section A, I describe my innovation.  In section B, I apply it to 
several of the major questions cases: Brown & Williamson, Gonzalez, King, and 
Texas v. U.S. 
 
A. A Proposal to Reform the Major Questions Doctrine 
 
My proposal is this: major questions should be resolved by agencies only 
through interpretive procedures that are responsive to public input on the 
important questions at issue. When a court reviews an agency interpretation of a 
	 50
statutory ambiguity that raises questions of vast economic and political 
significance, it should defer to the agency’s interpretation only if: (1) it was 
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, or other procedure of 
comparable deliberative intensity, and (2) the relevant questions of economic and 
political significance the court identifies have been properly “ventilated” and 
addressed in the course of the rulemaking.273 The rule thus follows Mead in 
treating a Congressional grant of notice-and-comment authority as a “good 
indication” that Congress intended to leave the interpretive question to the 
agency.274  As the Court recognized in Mead, notice-and-comment procedures 
tend to “foster the fairness and deliberation.”275 But my proposed approach does 
not treat such a grant of lawmaking authority as necessary or sufficient for the 
courts to give serious consideration to the interpretative perspective of an agency.  
Even if an agency doesn’t have rulemaking authority, its opinion on major 
questions might be accorded great weight if its official interpretation met the 
above criteria of discursive rationality and value ventilation.  Conversely, an 
agency would not receive Chevron deference, even if it did have such lawmaking 
authority, if it did not use procedures which met these same criteria.   
Such a requirement would require both courts and agencies to explicitly 
state what major questions were at issue, thus heightening the transparency of 
public decision-making.  It would encourage agencies to cover their bases by 
always considering what significant public norms might be involved in their 
rulemaking, lest a reviewing court deem that the issue was in fact one of major 
significance and fault the agency for failing to address the relevant political 
questions.  It would also encourage agencies to make significant shifts in policy 
through the rulemaking procedure rather than through interpretive rules or other 
guidance documents, which can be promulgated without public input. Such 
interpretations, even if promulgated in furtherance of the agencies’ delegated 
lawmaking authority, would not necessarily qualify for deference if the courts 
found that a major question was at play.  Only if interpretations documented a 
process of extensive public input over the relevant value questions comparable to 
a rulemaking proceeding would Chevron deference apply.   This approach would 
allow the possibility that agencies could resolve important policy questions, but 
would insist that they do some in a deliberative, inclusive, and transparent 
fashion.  In this way, public deliberation would be reinforced better than it 
currently is under the major question doctrine’s court-centric, technocracy-forcing 
approach. 
This approach is a marginal but nonetheless significant modification of the 
jurisprudence on agency statutory interpretation.  Chevron deference applies not 
only to agency interpretations promulgated through rulemaking or adjudication, 
but also to other agency interpretations made in furtherance of their power to 
make binding decisions with the force of law.276  In some cases, therefore, an 
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interpretive rule or opinion may receive Chevron deference.277  In addition, an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is given even more than Chevron 
deference—“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation.”278  This allows agencies to conduct a great deal of important 
policy work without the deliberative benefits of the notice-and-comment 
procedure. My proposal, by contrast, would require that any agency interpretation 
which raises a question of economic or political significance must be promulgated 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, or a process with 
comparable deliberative features, including: unrestricted access by any and all 
parties to the decision-making process, and agency deliberation which rationally 
responds to all relevant input it receives.  If an agency’s interpretive rule raises a 
significant value question, the interpretation would need to engage with and 
respond to public comments on that question to be given significant weight by a 
court.  For example, the Attorney General’s classification of drugs used in 
physician-assisted suicide in Gonzales would not have been owed deference 
because it was not promulgated through rulemaking or any comparable procedure.  
As the Court noted, in the case of the Interpretive Rule on medications used in 
assisted suicide, there was an “apparent absence of any consultation with anyone 
outside the Department of Justice who might aid in a reasoned judgment.”279  This 
interpretive rule therefore lacked any of the trappings of informal rulemaking, and 
concerned an issue subject to intensive, contemporaneous, and ethically 
significant public debate.  Courts should presume that Congress did not intend an 
agency to resolve such an important issue without extensive and politically 
substantive public input in the administrative process.   
The policy reason for this doctrinal adjustment would be to encourage 
agencies to make use of rulemaking when they make significant policy shifts.  
This approach acknowledges the fact that policy shifts through administrative 
action are an essential feature of life within our regulatory state, which would be 
very costly if not impossible to prevent entirely.  But it attempts nonetheless to 
ensure that these major administrative decisions are accompanied by sufficient 
public deliberation, consultation, and reasoned decision-making.  It makes use of 
our existing procedural repertoire to ensure that administrative action remains 
firmly tethered to an ongoing process of public opinion- and will-formation.  At 
the same time, it does not trespass the basic principle of administrative law that 
agencies are generally free to choose which procedures to use within their 
delegated authority.280 Instead, it calibrates the level of deference owed to the 
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agency according to the deliberative intensity of the procedure it elects to use to 
reach its interpretive conclusion. 
The legal justification for this approach is similar to that of the major 
questions doctrine, as applied to the Administrative Procedure Act itself.  Courts 
should interpret the APA in light of a presumption that Congress would not allow 
agencies to make major shifts in policy without significant procedural constraints.  
The under-enforced norm of non-delegation is protected by ensuring that 
procedural safeguards are in place to bound and inform the exercise of agency 
discretion. But this presumption cannot go so far as to undermine textual 
distinctions drawn by the Act. By granting an exemption from notice-and-
comment procedures for “interpretative rules and statements of policy,” Congress 
indicated that rules with greater binding effect should be promulgated with more 
robust procedural protections.281  At the same time, by not defining which rules 
are “substantive” and which are “interpretive,” the Act provides agencies with a 
degree of flexibility in exercising their delegated powers.282  Courts can best 
balance the twin purposes of procedural protection and regulatory flexibility by 
only requiring that rules be treated as “substantive” when they raise questions 
which the court determines to have deep economic and political significance.  
Under my proposed revision of the major questions doctrine, judicial 
deference to agencies’ resolution of major questions would require not only the 
use of deliberative decision-making procedures, but also that the relevant 
economic or political questions had been ventilated and rationally addressed by 
the agency on the record.  In other words, the agency’s “concise statement of 
basis and purpose”283 would have to discuss the major questions at issue, taking 
into account any relevant concerns raised by commenters. This requirement is not 
a modification of current administrative law doctrine, but merely a 
straightforward application of the existing rules to major questions.  When, in 
informal rulemaking, an administrative decision-maker “is obliged to make policy 
judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide 
the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found 
persuasive.”284  In the context of major questions cases, courts should ensure that 
the agency’s argumentation is not purely technical, but actually raises and 
addresses these questions, in its final rule.  If the agency fails to do so, this will go 
to show that they agency has not made use of the deliberation-reinforcing 
capacities of notice-and-comment rulemaking, and thus cannot claim deference 
for its preferred interpretation of the law.   
 
B. Applying the Approach to the Major Questions Cases 
 
 Consider how this aspect of the test would play out in some of the major 
questions cases discussed in Part I.  Since the courts do not always specify the 
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economic and political questions at issue, but only allude to the import of the 
challenged interpretation, I will attempt to offer a best guess.  In Brown & 
Williamson, one question of political significance was: how should the agency 
balance competing consideration of the public health risk caused by smoking and 
public values of individual responsibility and choice?  Responding to public 
comments on this topic, the final rule engaged with the question head on:  
 
FDA believes that adults should continue to have the freedom to choose 
whether or not they will use tobacco products. However, because nicotine 
is addictive, the choice of continuing to smoke, or use smokeless tobacco, 
may not be truly voluntary. Because abundant evidence shows that 
nicotine is addictive and that children are not equipped to make a mature 
choice about using tobacco products, the agency believes children under 
age 18 must be protected from this addictive substance.285   
 
In the FDA’s 223-page final rule, responding to over 700,000 comments, the 
agency addressed other important political questions such as the relationship 
between parents, children, and federal regulation,286 the allocation of regulatory 
responsibilities between the state and federal government,287 and the commercial 
rights of retailers. 288   The agency also referenced the President Clinton’s 
Wilsonian engagement with the public over the subject matter of the rule, 
focusing on public comments addressed directly to him by a coalition of medical 
associations,289 remarks to the press explaining the regulatory plan,290 and the 
input of the Ad Hoc Committee of the President’s Cancer Panel.291 The rule is 
thus a good example of an agency embracing the Progressive conception of the 
administrative state.  The agency deliberated over the public norms implicated by 
the rule, responded in rational fashion to a great volume of public comments, and 
referenced the President’s supervisory authority without becoming a mere 
instrument of presidential will. 
A court might, of course, find that other important issues of economic and 
political significance were not addressed in the rulemaking.  Or it might find that 
traditional principles of statutory construction barred the agency’s interpretation, 
irrespective of the fact that major questions were involved. But the great virtue of 
using a notice-and-comment rulemaking on such a high-profile issue as this is that 
it is likely that most if not all relevant issues will in fact be raised by commenters, 
and therefore the agency will have a legal responsibility to address them.  The 
courts should nonetheless retain the responsibility to scrutinize the record to 
ensure that important value choices and implications, as well as economic effects, 
have not escaped the agency’s notice.  The focus of judicial review of such major 
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regulatory cases should be on ensuring that the agency forthrightly engaged with 
the relevant policy questions, rather than presuming that the court is competent to 
resolve these questions without any reference to the agency’s deliberative 
engagement with the President and the affected public. 
 King v. Burwell offers a starkly different case.  There, the IRS had 
promulgated a regulation which curtly responded to some commenters’ argument 
that the language of the Affordable Care Act limits health care tax credits to those 
who enrolled on State Exchanges.  In a single paragraph, the IRS simply asserted, 
without offering an argument, that the statutory language supported the 
interpretation that tax credits were also available on federal and other exchanges, 
and that the legislative history “does not demonstrate that Congress intended to 
limit the premium tax credit to State Exchanges.” 292   It concluded that the 
Services’ proposed interpretation “is consistent with the language, purpose, and 
structure . . . of the Affordable Care Act as a whole.”293   
These statements are conclusory.  The IRS did not actually offer an 
argument on the major issue the Court subsequently addressed, namely whether 
the purpose or statutory scheme required the availability of tax credits on federal 
as well as state exchanges.  Given that the IRS did not engage in a substantive 
discussion of the policy questions implicated by one of the “Act’s key 
reforms,” 294  it was reasonable for the Court not to defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of the statutory ambiguity.  Had the IRS considered the policy 
implications of reserving subsidies for State Exchanges alone; had it offered a 
detailed discussion of the purpose of the Act in light of its overall structure and its 
legislative history; had it acknowledge background concerns economic liberty and 
dual sovereignty that arguably animated the King litigation; in that case the court 
ought to have deferred to the agencies interpretation.  But the IRS’ rule has much 
more the quality of an interstitial exercise in gap filling than an engagement over 
disputed issues of policy.  In other words, the meaning of this provision might 
have indeed become “a case for the IRS,” 295  but the IRS did not in fact 
demonstrate on the record the degree of deliberative attention that would have 
merited judicial deference to its resolution of the major question. 
Similarly, in Texas v. U.S., the Obama administration promulgated its 
deferred action policy, not through rulemaking, but through an enforcement 
memorandum. 296   The agency did not document any kind of robust public 
consultation process that would have indicated deliberative democratic 
engagement over the policy shift.  DHS’ failure to record any comparable 
deliberative process undermined its democratic authority to undertake a 
significant policy shift without explicit Congressional authorization.  This does 
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not mean that the Fifth Circuit was correct that the agency’s interpretation of the 
law was invalid.  It simply means a reviewing court would have no good reason to 
defer to the agency’s interpretation of the Act under these circumstances.  Under 
the approach I am advancing here, it does not matter whether such a major policy 
decision is categorized by the agency as “guidance,” a “rule” or a “general 
statement of policy.”  If an administrative policy is promulgated under any of 
these headings, and a court determines that the policy shift implicates a question 
of deep economic and political significance, the agency must document a value-





 Major questions will continue to surface regularly in administrative 
activity. For example, administrative agencies have recently promulgated 
statutory interpretations that require elaborate planning by local housing 
authorities to affirmatively further fair housing,297 and that allow the regulation of 
the Internet as a public utility.298  Courts can without difficulty find questions of 
deep economic and political significance in such areas.  When they do so, they 
should take care to observe the basic deliberative principles that legitimate 
administrative activity in our Progressive administrative state.  They should not 
reflexively assume that the implication of such value choices precludes deference 
to the agency, and permits the court to determine the issue de novo without any 
solicitude for administrative judgment.  Instead, courts should only defer to the 
agency if the agency has reached its interpretation through an open, inclusive and 
rational discussion of the policy choices at issue.  In this way, courts can respect 
the institutional competence of agencies as participants in the articulation of 
democratic purposes, without abdicating their responsibility to ensure that We, the 
people retain authorship over the rules that bind us. 
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